The Library — Blogs, Insights, Guides & Videos

Blog16 Jan 2026

Hella Infra FY25: Sales grew 27%, PAT fell 42% — what really happened?

<div class="relative basis-auto flex-col -mb-(--composer-overlap-px) [--composer-overlap-px:28px] grow flex"> <div class="flex flex-col text-sm pb-25"> <article class="text-token-text-primary w-full focus:outline-none [--shadow-height:45px] has-data-writing-block:pointer-events-none has-data-writing-block:-mt-(--shadow-height) has-data-writing-block:pt-(--shadow-height) [&:has([data-writing-block])>*]:pointer-events-auto [content-visibility:auto] supports-[content-visibility:auto]:[contain-intrinsic-size:auto_100lvh] scroll-mt-[calc(var(--header-height)+min(200px,max(70px,20svh)))]" dir="auto" tabindex="-1" data-turn-id="d6bba58e-0924-4754-931a-109565551916" data-testid="conversation-turn-1" data-scroll-anchor="true" data-turn="assistant"> <div class="text-base my-auto mx-auto pb-10 [--thread-content-margin:--spacing(4)] @w-sm/main:[--thread-content-margin:--spacing(6)] @w-lg/main:[--thread-content-margin:--spacing(16)] px-(--thread-content-margin)"> <div class="[--thread-content-max-width:40rem] @w-lg/main:[--thread-content-max-width:48rem] mx-auto max-w-(--thread-content-max-width) flex-1 group/turn-messages focus-visible:outline-hidden relative flex w-full min-w-0 flex-col agent-turn" tabindex="-1"> <div class="flex max-w-full flex-col grow"> <div class="min-h-8 text-message relative flex w-full flex-col items-end gap-2 text-start break-words whitespace-normal [.text-message+&]:mt-1" dir="auto" data-message-author-role="assistant" data-message-id="d6bba58e-0924-4754-931a-109565551916" data-message-model-slug="gpt-5-2-thinking"> <div class="flex w-full flex-col gap-1 empty:hidden first:pt-[1px]"> <div class="markdown prose dark:prose-invert w-full break-words light markdown-new-styling"> If you only look at the topline, Hella Infra had a strong year. Revenue jumped 27% to ₹18,471.94 Cr (FY24: ₹14,530.24 Cr). But the moment you scroll to the bottom, the mood changes: PAT fell 42% to ₹219.74 Cr (FY24: ₹378.04 Cr). So what’s going on? This isn’t a single-line explanation. FY25 is a year where four pressure points hit together—Other Income, Other Expenses, Depreciation, Debt/interest—and all of it is linked to a shift in revenue mix and a much heavier balance sheet. <h3 data-start="691" data-end="713">The one-line summary</h3> Hella Infra’s FY25 looks like an execution-heavy expansion year: the company shifted toward finished goods + services, spent aggressively on assets, took on more working-capital debt, and lost a large one-off other-income cushion that boosted FY24 profits. <h3 data-start="1000" data-end="1080">1) Revenue grew, but the mix changed—and that changes margin and cash behavior</h3> <img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1768561043.jpg" alt="" width="50%" /> <h3 data-start="1082" data-end="1112">Revenue mix (FY25 vs FY24)</h3> <img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1768561104.jpg" alt="" width="50%" /> <ul data-start="1113" data-end="1367"> <li data-start="1113" data-end="1181"> Traded goods: ₹9,763.79 Cr vs ₹10,164.09 Cr (down ~4%) </li> <li data-start="1182" data-end="1251"> Finished goods: ₹8,076.65 Cr vs ₹4,034.35 Cr (up ~100%) </li> <li data-start="1252" data-end="1310"> Services: ₹600.63 Cr vs ₹316.23 Cr (up ~90%) </li> <li data-start="1311" data-end="1367"> Other operating revenue (small): included in total </li> </ul> What this implies: The growth is not coming from “simple trading volume.” It’s coming from a more execution-intensive model—finished goods and services. And that’s where the story begins. When finished goods + services scale up quickly, you typically see: <ul data-start="1637" data-end="1805"> <li data-start="1637" data-end="1688"> higher input usage (materials, consumables, fuel) </li> <li data-start="1689" data-end="1725"> more subcontracting and site costs </li> <li data-start="1726" data-end="1753"> higher freight/forwarding </li> <li data-start="1754" data-end="1805"> heavier working capital (inventory + receivables) </li> </ul> And FY25 shows exactly that. <h3 data-start="1842" data-end="1924">2) Pressure Point #1: Other Income collapsed—because FY24 had a big one-off gain</h3> Other income fell from ₹213.22 Cr to ₹83.84 Cr (down ~₹129.38 Cr). The key missing piece: FY24 included a large “fair value gain on investment in associate” of ~₹168.60 Cr, which did not repeat in FY25. FY25 did have positives like higher interest on bank deposits and some gains, but they were too small to replace the missing one-off. Why it matters: Even if operations stayed the same, losing a ₹100–170 Cr profit cushion makes PAT look dramatically weaker. So FY25 is more “core” than FY24. But unfortunately, core operations also got costlier. <h3 data-start="2505" data-end="2594">3) Pressure Point #2: Other Expenses exploded—and the pattern screams “execution costs”</h3> Other expenses jumped from ₹1,403.37 Cr to ₹2,684.76 Cr—up ₹1,281.39 Cr. And the increase isn’t hidden in admin lines. It’s concentrated in the four most “project execution” buckets: <h3 data-start="2793" data-end="2828">Biggest blowouts (FY25 vs FY24)</h3> <ol data-start="2829" data-end="3145"> <li data-start="2829" data-end="2898"> Power & fuel: ₹568.02 Cr vs ₹131.38 Cr → +₹436.64 Cr </li> <li data-start="2899" data-end="2985"> Labour & contracting services: ₹591.38 Cr vs ₹253.07 Cr → +₹338.31 Cr </li> <li data-start="2986" data-end="3069"> Hire, freight & forwarding: ₹630.76 Cr vs ₹429.07 Cr → +₹201.69 Cr </li> <li data-start="3070" data-end="3145"> Stores & consumables: ₹238.12 Cr vs ₹121.70 Cr → +₹116.42 Cr </li> </ol> These four alone account for ~₹1,093 Cr out of the ₹1,281 Cr overall rise. Interpretation: FY25 growth required much heavier execution—fuel consumption, logistics intensity, subcontracting and operating consumption surged. This aligns perfectly with the revenue mix shift (finished goods + services ramp-up). <h3 data-start="3478" data-end="3562">4) Pressure Point #3: Depreciation doubled—because the asset base expanded rapidly</h3> <img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1768561153.jpg" alt="" width="50%" /> Depreciation & amortisation rose from ₹216.81 Cr to ₹445.56 Cr (up ₹228.75 Cr). That doesn’t happen unless the company has: <ul data-start="3701" data-end="3829"> <li data-start="3701" data-end="3734"> commissioned new assets, and/or </li> <li data-start="3735" data-end="3788"> significantly increased plant and equipment, and/or </li> <li data-start="3789" data-end="3829"> brought acquired assets onto the books </li> </ul> And the balance sheet confirms exactly that. <h3 data-start="3882" data-end="3971">5) Pressure Point #4: Debt rose sharply—especially short-term—and finance cost followed</h3> Borrowings increased from ₹3,959.75 Cr to ₹6,056.03 Cr (up ₹2,096.28 Cr, +53%). But the real detail is in the composition: <ul data-start="4110" data-end="4277"> <li data-start="4110" data-end="4192"> Current borrowings: ₹4,388.51 Cr vs ₹2,504.91 Cr → +₹1,883.60 Cr </li> <li data-start="4193" data-end="4277"> Non-current borrowings: ₹1,667.52 Cr vs ₹1,454.84 Cr → +₹212.68 Cr </li> </ul> So the jump is largely working-capital / short-term funding, not just long-tenor project finance. As expected, finance cost rose: <ul data-start="4414" data-end="4486"> <li data-start="4414" data-end="4486"> Finance cost: ₹804.83 Cr vs ₹554.02 Cr (up ₹250.81 Cr) </li> </ul> Why does this matter? Short-term borrowings are usually taken to fund: <ul data-start="4565" data-end="4661"> <li data-start="4565" data-end="4578"> receivables </li> <li data-start="4579" data-end="4590"> inventory </li> <li data-start="4591" data-end="4612"> execution intensity </li> <li data-start="4613" data-end="4661"> timing mismatch between billing and collection </li> </ul> And we can actually see working capital expanding. <h3 data-start="4720" data-end="4805">6) The balance sheet confirms the “working capital + expansion + acquisition” story</h3> <h3 data-start="4807" data-end="4841">Balance sheet size jumped ~54%</h3> <ul data-start="4842" data-end="4911"> <li data-start="4842" data-end="4911"> Total assets: ₹16,540 Cr vs ₹10,742 Cr → +₹5,798 Cr </li> </ul> <h3 data-start="4913" data-end="4950">Non-current assets nearly doubled</h3> <ul data-start="4951" data-end="5024"> <li data-start="4951" data-end="5024"> Non-current assets: ₹7,067 Cr vs ₹3,654 Cr → +₹3,413 Cr </li> </ul> Key drivers: <ul data-start="5039" data-end="5345"> <li data-start="5039" data-end="5138"> PPE: ₹3,169 Cr vs ₹1,182 Cr → +₹1,988 Cr → strong capex / asset commissioning </li> <li data-start="5139" data-end="5250"> Goodwill: ₹2,011 Cr vs ₹912 Cr → +₹1,099 Cr → indicates acquisitions/business combination </li> <li data-start="5251" data-end="5345"> Intangibles under development & CWIP also rose → some projects still under execution </li> </ul> <h3 data-start="5347" data-end="5416">Current assets also rose meaningfully (working capital expansion)</h3> <ul data-start="5417" data-end="5486"> <li data-start="5417" data-end="5486"> Current assets: ₹9,442 Cr vs ₹7,079 Cr → +₹2,364 Cr </li> </ul> Key working capital movers: <ul data-start="5516" data-end="5649"> <li data-start="5516" data-end="5588"> Trade receivables: ₹6,245 Cr vs ₹5,230 Cr → +₹1,014 Cr </li> <li data-start="5589" data-end="5649"> Inventories: ₹958 Cr vs ₹490 Cr → +₹469 Cr </li> </ul> This explains why current borrowings rose so much. Execution-heavy businesses often grow revenue by deploying cash into receivables and inventory first. <h3 data-start="5812" data-end="5846">So why did PAT fall? Put simply:</h3> <h3 data-start="5848" data-end="5902">FY25 had three negatives and one missing positive:</h3> Missing positive (FY24 one-off): <ul data-start="5941" data-end="6010"> <li data-start="5941" data-end="6010"> other income had a large fair value gain in FY24 that didn’t repeat </li> </ul> Negatives (FY25 structural pressures): <ol data-start="6055" data-end="6266"> <li data-start="6055" data-end="6144"> other expenses surged with execution scale (fuel, freight, contracting, consumables) </li> <li data-start="6145" data-end="6194"> depreciation rose as the asset base expanded </li> <li data-start="6195" data-end="6266"> debt and interest rose as working capital and capex needed funding </li> </ol> So even though revenue rose, the company experienced: <ul data-start="6322" data-end="6419"> <li data-start="6322" data-end="6345"> lower non-core income </li> <li data-start="6346" data-end="6379"> higher operating cost intensity </li> <li data-start="6380" data-end="6419"> higher fixed charges (D&A + interest) </li> </ul> That combination compresses PAT quickly. <h3 data-start="6468" data-end="6544">What to watch next: Is FY25 a temporary “transition year” or a new normal?</h3> If FY25 is a ramp-up year, FY26 should show improvements in these four indicators: <ol data-start="6630" data-end="7065"> <li data-start="6630" data-end="6721"> Other expenses as % of revenue Do fuel/freight/contracting intensity come down? </li> <li data-start="6723" data-end="6833"> Receivable days / working capital discipline Do trade receivables and inventory start normalising? </li> <li data-start="6835" data-end="6923"> Debt profile Does reliance on short-term borrowing reduce or get refinanced? </li> <li data-start="6925" data-end="7065"> Core profitability (excluding one-offs) FY24 had a big fair value gain—so compare FY26 with FY25 on core margins, not with FY24. </li> </ol> <h3 data-start="7072" data-end="7090">Closing thought</h3> Hella Infra’s FY25 doesn’t look like a demand problem. It looks like an execution + scaling + integration year where profit took a hit because the cost base and funding needs expanded faster than the benefits of scale could show up. If the capex and acquisition translate into better throughput and margins while working capital stabilises, FY25 may be remembered as “investment pain.” If not, the risk is that FY25 marks a structurally higher cost and leverage base </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </div> </article> </div> </div> <div id="thread-bottom-container" class="sticky bottom-0 group/thread-bottom-container relative isolate z-10 w-full basis-auto has-data-has-thread-error:pt-2 has-data-has-thread-error:[box-shadow:var(--sharp-edge-bottom-shadow)] md:border-transparent md:pt-0 dark:border-white/20 md:dark:border-transparent print:hidden content-fade single-line flex flex-col"> <div class="-mt-4 text-token-text-secondary relative flex min-h-8 w-full items-center justify-center p-2 text-center text-xs [view-transition-name:var(--vt-disclaimer)] md:px-[60px]"> <div class="pointer-events-auto"> </div> </div> </div>

Read →630 views

Blog15 Jan 2026

NSE IPO Moves a Step Closer: SEBI’s “In-Principle” Nod to Settle the Unfair Access Case — What It Means for Unlisted Shareholders

Read →4.1K views

Blog15 Jan 2026

HDFC Securities 9M FY26: When capital-market earnings stop compounding like 2020–2024

From 2020 onwards, capital market businesses lived in a sweet spot. More demat accounts, higher turnover, nonstop IPO buzz, derivatives frenzy, and a retail wave that made broking earnings look almost linear. But HDFC Securities latest numbers are a reminder: this is still a cycle business—and we are now seeing the normalisation phase. <h3 class="p2">A) The scoreboard (9M FY26 vs 9M FY25)</h3> For the nine months ended 31 December 2025 (9M FY26), HDFC Securities reported: <ul class="ul1"> <li class="li3">Revenue from operations: ₹2,257 cr vs ₹2,521 cr (down ~10.5%) </li> <li class="li3">Profit before tax (PBT): ₹884 cr vs ₹1,164 cr (down ~24.1%) </li> <li class="li3">Profit after tax (PAT): ₹661 cr vs ₹873 cr (down ~24.3%) </li> </ul> So yes, revenue softened. But profits fell much faster—the classic sign that operating leverage has flipped. <img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1768469861.jpeg" alt="" width="50%" height="50%" /> <h3 class="p2">B) What exactly slowed?</h3> 1) The most “market-linked” line item got hit: Fees & commission income Fees & commission fell to ₹1,095.3 cr from ₹1,356.8 cr (down ~19.3%) This is the line most sensitive to: <ul class="ul1"> <li class="li3">trading activity / churn,</li> <li class="li3">broking yields and pricing pressure,</li> <li class="li3">distribution economics,</li> <li class="li3">overall investor risk appetite.</li> </ul> When this number falls, it usually means the business is moving from “hot market” to “steady market.” 2) Interest income stayed steady, but couldn’t offset the drop Interest income was ₹1,071 cr vs ₹1,092 cr (down ~2%) So the “balance-sheet/interest” leg didn’t collapse. But the “activity/fee” leg did—and that’s what matters in broking cycles. <h3 class="p2">C) Costs: the silent profit killer in a cooling cycle</h3> Here’s the part investors often miss. In capital-market businesses, when revenue slows, costs don’t automatically come down. Employee benefit expense rose to ₹449 cr from ₹345 cr (up ~30%) And management also disclosed a specific driver: a ₹29 cr provision towards past service cost on gratuity (linked to Labour Codes) recognised during the quarter ended 31 Dec 2025 and included in employee benefit expense. So even if market activity cools, compliance and provisioning can still push costs higher. <h3 class="p2">D) Margins tell the real story</h3> <ul class="ul1"> <li class="li3">Operating margin (PBT / Revenue from ops): 39% vs 46% </li> <li class="li3">Net profit margin: 29% vs 35% </li> </ul> This is why the profit drop looks sharper than the revenue drop: margins compressed. <h3 class="p2">E) So what’s happening to capital-market stocks now?</h3> The broader “capital markets rally” that began in 2020 was built on a simple formula: More investors + more trades + more leverage + more IPOs = higher revenues = operating leverage = EPS compounding = valuation re-rating But cycles mature. Today, the sector is dealing with: <ul class="ul1"> <li class="li3">volume normalisation (growth rate, not the absolute level),</li> <li class="li3">pricing pressure in broking,</li> <li class="li3">rising tech + compliance costs,</li> <li class="li3">and investors demanding “growth + margins” rather than “just growth”.</li> </ul> In short: Capital-market businesses haven’t become bad businesses. They’ve just stopped looking like guaranteed high-growth compounders every quarter. <h3 class="p5">F) The valuation lens (Unlisted vs Listed)</h3> Now comes the interesting part. 1. HDFC Securities (Unlisted market) The current unlisted valuation of HDFC Securities is around ₹16,800 cr market cap. Using assumption of FY26 expected PAT ~₹900 cr, the implied multiple is: <ul class="ul1"> <li class="li3">P/E ≈ 18.66x (₹16,800 cr / ₹900 cr)</li> </ul> 2. Angel One (Listed) Angel One’s P/E is being quoted around ~29x in the market currently. <h3 class="p2">G) Why is HDFC Securities cheaper?</h3> Because the market is pricing in three things: <ol class="ol1"> <li class="li3">Unlisted discount Liquidity, price discovery, and exit timelines are uncertain in unlisted space—so multiples stay lower. </li> <li class="li3">Growth visibility is softer right now 9M FY26 shows a clear slowdown in fees & commission income and a profit correction. </li> <li class="li3">Operating leverage has turned negative in this phase Margins compressed from 46% to 39% at the operating level, and 35% to 29% at net level. </li> </ol> So the market’s message is basically: “HDFC Securities is a strong franchise, but right now it’s not being priced like a high-growth momentum broker.” <h3 class="p5">H) The investor takeaway</h3> If the 2020–2024 rally was the “party phase” for capital-market stocks, FY26 is looking more like the “hangover phase”—where growth must be earned, not assumed. For HDFC Securities, the key variables to watch going forward are: <ul class="ul1"> <li class="li3">Fees & commission stabilisation (because that’s the most cycle-sensitive engine) </li> <li class="li3">Cost control / one-offs normalising (employee cost spike + provisioning impact) </li> <li class="li3">Margin recovery (because that decides whether earnings bounce faster than revenue) </li> <li class="li3">And finally, whether the sector gets a fresh tailwind from a stronger market cycle.</li> </ul> And if your unlisted valuation math holds—~18.7x forward P/E for HDFC Securities vs ~29x for Angel One—then the debate becomes simple: Is HDFC Securities a “slower growth but stronger franchise” play that deserves re-rating when the cycle turns, or is the market right to keep it discounted due to growth/visibility?

Read →741 views

Blog14 Jan 2026

Liquidnitro Games Levels Up With $19.1 Million Series A — What’s Really Going On?

If you’ve ever wondered how fast the gaming world is changing, here’s your answer: a Hyderabad-based studio barely a year old just raised $19.1 million — and global investors are lining up for a piece of it. Liquidnitro Games, founded in December 2023 by four Electronic Arts veterans — Sandeep Kowdley, Krishna Dhanekula, Arun Kunchala, and Suresh Manthena — has pulled off one of the most significant raises in India’s emerging AI-gaming ecosystem. Here’s the UnlistedZone-style breakdown. <h3>A) The Big Raise</h3> Liquidnitro Games secured $19.1 million in its Series A round led by Northpoint Capital, with participation from existing investor Nexus Venture Partners. This comes two years after its $5.25 million seed round. Why the excitement? Because Liquidnitro isn’t just making games — it’s re-imagining how global game production should work. <h3>B) So, What Does Liquidnitro Actually Do?</h3> Think of Liquidnitro as the behind-the-scenes powerhouse for global publishers. They help: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Build and co-produce games </li> <li> Run multi‑year live services (continuous updates, events, in-game economies) </li> <li> Geo-adapt games to suit new markets (especially India) </li> <li> Manage user engagement using AI and real-time data insights </li> </ul> Basically, they help publishers earn more by keeping players hooked. <h3>C) Why Investors Are Betting Big</h3> The founders have a serious track record. Between them, they’ve managed iconic franchises like: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Bejeweled </li> <li> Tetris </li> <li> Plants vs Zombies </li> <li> Need for Speed </li> <li> Real Racing </li> <li> The Sims </li> </ul> In a market where building and running games is getting more expensive and competitive, experience matters. And Liquidnitro’s model solves three big pain points for global publishers: <h4>1. High cost of building & maintaining games</h4> Liquidnitro provides end-to-end production support + AI automation. <h4>2. Localisation challenges in emerging markets</h4> They customise games for India, MENA, and Southeast Asia — all fast-growing markets. <h4>3. Live services complexity</h4> They take ownership of live ops, updates, analytics, player retention, and monetisation. This reduces cost, speeds up production, and helps publishers scale faster. <h3>D) How Will They Use the New Funding?</h3> Liquidnitro plans to deploy the $19.1 million for four key goals: <ol start="1" data-spread="false"> <li> Scale AI-enabled game production </li> <li> Enhance their live services and analytics platform </li> <li> Co-invest with global game publishers </li> <li> Expand into high-growth regions: India, MENA, Southeast Asia </li> </ol> The company also hints at deeper partnerships, more franchises, and a larger operating footprint. <h3>E) But Why AI in Gaming?</h3> Because games now run like mini-economies. AI helps: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Predict user behaviour </li> <li> Personalise game difficulty and rewards </li> <li> Manage live events dynamically </li> <li> Optimise monetisation without annoying players </li> </ul> It’s no longer just about graphics — it’s about psychology, data, and retention. <h3>F) What Investors Are Saying</h3> Northpoint Capital believes Liquidnitro is becoming the go-to partner for top publishers. Nexus Venture Partners calls it a “category-defining company.” The common theme? Execution. Liquidnitro has rapidly onboarded major publishers within months of launching. <h3>The Bigger Picture</h3> The global gaming industry is shifting — publishers want: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Lower costs </li> <li> Faster production </li> <li> Data-driven live operations </li> <li> Region-specific adaptations </li> </ul> Liquidnitro is positioning itself as the solution to all four. And with AI at the center of its platform, it’s aligned perfectly with where the industry is headed. <h3>The Bottom Line</h3> Liquidnitro Games isn’t building the next PUBG or Candy Crush. It’s building the AI-powered machinery that keeps the global gaming economy running. And with $19.1 million in fresh fuel, it’s just getting started.

Read →402 views

Blog13 Jan 2026

Sukino Raises $31 Million: Betting Big on India’s Long-Term Healthcare Gap

India’s healthcare system has a missing middle. Hospitals are overcrowded, home-care is unstructured, and millions of patients recovering from surgeries, accidents, or chronic illness face an uncomfortable choice — stay in hospitals longer than needed or go home without structured medical support. Bengaluru-based Sukino wants to fix this gap. And now, it has fresh capital to scale. The long-term healthcare startup has raised $31 million (₹50 crore) in a round led by Bessemer, with participation from Zerodha’s investment arm, Rainmatter. The company plans to expand into new cities and broaden its medical and rehabilitative care offerings. <h2>A) What Problem Is Sukino Solving?</h2> India is witnessing a sharp rise in chronic illnesses — stroke, cancer, respiratory disorders, kidney disease, Alzheimer’s — and nearly all of them require long-term recovery. But hospitals aren’t built for prolonged care. Beds are limited, costs escalate quickly, and early discharge often shifts the burden to families. This results in untrained home-care, inconsistent monitoring, and higher chances of complications. Sukino offers a structured alternative — multidisciplinary, out-of-hospital care for: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Post-acute patients recovering from surgeries </li> <li> Stroke and neuro-rehab patients </li> <li> Long-term chronic illness cases </li> <li> Elderly patients needing continuous monitoring </li> <li> Patients transitioning from hospital to home </li> </ul> The idea is simple: provide hospital-level care without hospital-level chaos. <h2>B) How Does Sukino Operate?</h2> Sukino blends rehabilitation, monitoring, and medical support into a single ecosystem. Its services include: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> 24/7 nurse-assisted critical care </li> <li> Physiotherapy and rehabilitation programs </li> <li> Post-operative care support </li> <li> Chronic disease management </li> <li> Palliative assistance </li> <li> Home-care with medical equipment and monitoring </li> </ul> Patients receive consistent care while families reduce financial and emotional strain. <h2>C) Where Is Sukino Headquartered?</h2> Sukino operates out of Bengaluru, which also serves as its strategic and operational headquarters. The city’s large elderly population and rising chronic illness cases make it one of India’s most important recovery markets. <h2>D) About the Founder</h2> Sukino was founded in 2015 by Rajinish Menon, who built the company on the principle of compassionate, structured, long-term patient support. The name draws inspiration from the mantra: “Om Loka Samastah Sukino Bhavantu” — May all beings be free from suffering.” This philosophy shapes Sukino’s focus on dignity-led recovery and patient comfort. <h2>E) Why This Funding Matters</h2> India’s healthcare, especially long-term care, is deeply underserved. Three major trends make Sukino’s model crucial: <h3>1. Rising Chronic Disease Burden</h3> India’s chronic illness cases are growing rapidly, increasing demand for continuous medical support. <h3>2. Ageing Population</h3> India is on track to have the world’s largest elderly population by 2050, making long-term care essential. <h3>3. Hospital Bed Shortage</h3> India has only 1.3 hospital beds per 1,000 people — far below global averages — making post-discharge care facilities necessary. Sukino directly addresses all three issues. <h2>Bottom Line</h2> Sukino isn’t replacing hospitals — it is extending them. By filling the gap between hospital discharge and full recovery, it offers structured, affordable, medically supervised care. The fresh funding positions Sukino to become a major player in India’s long-term healthcare ecosystem, reshaping how patients recover outside hospitals in the coming decade.

Read →312 views

Blog12 Jan 2026

NSE IPO AFTER A DECADE? SEBI CHAIRMAN CONFIRMS NOC BY MONTH-END

In what could be one of India’s biggest market events of the decade, SEBI chairman Tuhin Kanta Pandey has finally confirmed that the National Stock Exchange (NSE) is set to receive its long-pending No-Objection Certificate (NOC) for its IPO by the end of this month. If this happens, it will unblock an IPO that has been stuck for almost 10 years, making it one of the most delayed public listings in Indian corporate history. <h2>A) Why NSE’s IPO Was Delayed for 10 Years</h2> NSE first filed its DRHP in December 2016. But what followed was a long list of compliance hurdles and regulatory scrutiny. <h3>Key Reasons for the Delay</h3> <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Co-location controversy and allegations of preferential access to algorithmic traders </li> <li> Governance lapses flagged by SEBI </li> <li> TAP (Trading Access Point) architecture and network concerns </li> <li> Multiple unsuccessful NOC attempts in 2019, 2020, and August 2024 </li> </ul> NSE has since settled several major disputes, including a ₹643 crore penalty for the co-location and connectivity issues. <h2>B) What SEBI Chairman Said</h2> SEBI chief Pandey stated in Chennai: <blockquote> “We will give the NOC to NSE by this month end. Listing and other procedures regarding the IPO will be taken care of by them.” </blockquote> This indicates regulatory closure and shifts the responsibility to NSE to resume listing procedures. <h2>C) Financial Performance Snapshot (₹ Crore)</h2> <h3><img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1768207849.jpg" alt="" width="50%" /></h3> <h3>Valuation Metrics</h3> <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Market Cap: ₹5.01 lakh crore </li> <li> Estimated FY26 PAT: ~₹9814 crore </li> <li> P/E multiple (FY26E): ~51x </li> </ul> <h2>D) SEBI on SME IPOs and Finfluencers</h2> <h3>SME IPO Volatility</h3> SEBI clarified that it does not decide valuations. Its focus is only on ensuring robust disclosures. New advertisement norms now clearly label whether an IPO is SME or mainboard. <h3>Crackdown on Finfluencers</h3> <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Nearly 100,000 videos removed for illegal stock tips </li> <li> AI tool Sudarshan deployed to scan influencer content </li> <li> Stricter norms for misleading financial promotions </li> </ul> <h2>E) Conflict of Interest Review Update</h2> SEBI’s high-level committee is still evaluating conflict of interest rules for officials. More discussions are ongoing regarding public disclosures and governance frameworks. <h2>Why This NSE IPO Matters</h2> <h3>For Investors</h3> <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Opportunity to invest in India’s largest exchange </li> <li> Exposure to a monopoly-like business model </li> <li> Strong profitability and high entry barriers </li> </ul> <h3>For the Market</h3> <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Increased transparency </li> <li> Stronger governance frameworks </li> <li> Potential to attract global institutional investors </li> </ul> <h2>Bottom Line</h2> After nearly a decade of delays, NSE’s IPO may finally be set in motion. With regulatory clearance likely this month and strong financials supporting the narrative, 2026 could witness one of the most significant listings in Indian market history.

Read →3.6K views

Blog9 Jan 2026

Can MSEI Finally Restart Trading?

Read →13.7K views

Blog8 Jan 2026

Singularity AMC Backs Lohia Aerospace — India’s Composites Push Gets Real

India wants to become a serious player in high-value aerostructures — the stuff that goes into aircraft wings, UAV frames, satellite components, and next‑gen defence platforms. Singularity AMC has now invested $11.14 million (nearly ₹100 crore) into Lohia Aerospace Systems, signalling strong private‑capital confidence in India’s aerospace manufacturing capability. <h2>A) What Lohia Aerospace Makes</h2> Lohia Aerospace manufactures advanced composite materials, high‑precision aerostructures, and systems for aircraft, UAVs, defence platforms, satellites, and mobility applications. They supply directly to global OEMs. Their portfolio includes: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Aircraft composite parts </li> <li> UAV and drone airframes </li> <li> Passenger‑to‑Freighter conversion components </li> <li> Business jet structural components </li> <li> Space and communication composite structures </li> <li> Automotive and mobility composites </li> </ul> <h2>B) Why Singularity AMC Invested</h2> <h3>1. Rising Industry Opportunity</h3> India’s aerospace and defence market is valued at $27.4 billion and is expected to reach $54.4 billion by 2033 at a 7% CAGR. Demand for composite materials is accelerating globally as platforms shift from metal to lightweight, high‑strength composites. <h3>2. Lohia’s Strategic Advantage</h3> Lohia Aerospace has vertically integrated operations, deep engineering capability, advanced manufacturing systems, and a strong export track record. With a training and R&D ecosystem spanning India and Israel, the company possesses scalable talent and process strength. <h2>C) Management Perspective</h2> Anurag Lohia (MD) sees the investment as a milestone that accelerates global expansion, strengthens product offerings, and aligns with the Aatmanirbhar Bharat mission. Singularity AMC’s leadership highlights Lohia’s precision manufacturing and strong quality focus as key reasons for backing the company. <h2>Financial Snapshot</h2> <img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1767871118.jpg" alt="" width="50%" /> Lohia Aerospace has grown rapidly: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Revenue rose from ₹4 crore in FY22 to ₹64 crore in FY24. </li> <li> EBITDA turned positive at ₹3 crore in FY24. </li> <li> Cash flows improved significantly. </li> <li> PAT remains negative due to expansion and debt servicing. </li> </ul> <h2>D) Competitive Landscape (FY 2024 Financials)</h2> <img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1767871147.jpg" alt="" width="50%" /> Against peers like Kineco Aerospace (₹175 crore revenue, ₹27 crore EBITDA), Lohia is smaller but scaling quickly with stronger export alignment. <h2>E) Valuation Explained</h2> As of March 2024, Lohia Aerospace had 2.50 crore shares outstanding. In November 2025, the company issued an additional 45.77 lakh shares. This issuance comprised two components: <ol start="1" data-spread="false"> <li> 32.9 lakh shares were issued as part of a debt-to-equity conversion, with shares being transferred to promoters. </li> <li> 12.8 lakh shares were issued through a rights offering. </li> </ol> Consequently, the total number of outstanding shares increased to 2.957 crore. The last round valued the company at ₹122 per share, implying a pre‑money valuation of roughly ₹361 crore. Investors are effectively valuing the company at over 6x FY24 revenue, indicating confidence in long‑term export‑driven scaling rather than current profits. Singularity AMC has invested approximately ₹100 crore in Lohia Aerospace, though the specific valuation and issue price of the transaction remain undisclosed. <h2>F) The Big Picture</h2> <ol start="1" data-spread="false"> <li> India is pushing to become a global hub for aerospace composites. </li> <li> Private capital is entering the sector aggressively. </li> <li> Lohia Aerospace is emerging as a credible international supplier with deep technical competency. </li> </ol> The investment positions Lohia as a key player in India’s aerospace manufacturing landscape, ready to ride the next decade of defence and aviation growth.

Read →536 views

Blog6 Jan 2026

Maxvalue Credit and Investments Limited goes From Growth to Risk Containment in India’s NBFC Space

<h3>Who Is Maxvalue Credit and Investments?</h3> Maxvalue Credit and Investments Limited is a non-banking financial company (NBFC) focused on retail and small-ticket lending, primarily across southern India. The company offers a diversified loan portfolio that includes: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Auto Loans </li> <li> Gold Loans </li> <li> Trader & MSME Loans </li> <li> Microfinance Loans </li> </ul> Alongside lending, Maxvalue also provides investment products to its investors in the form of fully secured Non-Convertible Redeemable Debentures (NCDs) and Subordinated Debt, strictly in line with regulations prescribed by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the Companies Act, 2013. In simple terms, Maxvalue borrows money at regulated costs, lends it across secured and semi-secured products, and earns the spread—while maintaining capital buffers well above regulatory thresholds. <h2>Safe on Capital, Soft on Profits — What’s Really Going On?</h2> At first glance, this NBFC looks safe. Capital adequacy is strong, branches are spread across four southern states, and gold loans now dominate the portfolio. But dig deeper into the numbers, and a more nuanced story emerges—one of shrinking income, stressed asset quality in key segments, and profitability under pressure. <h3> Income Is Falling—and Fast</h3> Total income declined sharply: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> FY23: ₹136.7 crore </li> <li> FY25: ₹104.7 crore </li> </ul> That’s a ~23% drop in just two years. The core reason? Interest income, which fell from ₹117.2 crore to ₹88.6 crore. While fee-based income did grow (₹7.8 crore → ₹9.8 crore), it wasn’t enough to offset the fall in lending income. Translation: The lending book is either shrinking, yielding less, or both. <h3>Revenue from Operations (₹ Cr)</h3> <img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1767702726.jpg" alt="" width="50%" /> <h3>Loan Portfolio / AUM (₹ Cr)</h3> <h3><img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1767702579.jpg" alt="" width="50%" /></h3> <h3>Profitability & Margin Snapshot (FY23–FY25)</h3> <img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1767702553.jpg" alt="" width="50%" /> What this reveals: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> NII peaked in FY24 but slipped in FY25 as loan growth slowed. </li> <li> NIM expansion in FY24 was driven by lower funding costs; FY25 shows margin compression despite cheaper borrowings. </li> <li> Operating margins remain healthy, but they cannot fully offset falling revenues. </li> <li> Asset quality deterioration in FY25 (GNPA & NNPA) directly explains the sharp drop in PAT. </li> </ul> <h3>Profits: From Recovery to Regression</h3> After years of losses, the company finally turned profitable in FY24 with a PAT of ₹10 crore. But the relief was short-lived. <ul data-spread="false"> <li> FY24 PAT: ₹10.4 crore </li> <li> FY25 PAT: ₹3.7 crore </li> </ul> Margins compressed sharply: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Net Profit Margin: 8% → 3.8% </li> </ul> So while the company stayed in the black, profitability weakened significantly. <h3>Cost Control Helped—But Not Enough</h3> There is one positive: operating discipline. Between FY22 and FY25: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Employee expenses fell from ₹36 crore to ₹33 crore </li> <li> Other expenses nearly halved from ₹58 crore to ₹26 crore </li> <li> Finance costs dropped sharply from ₹96 crore to ₹39 crore </li> </ul> Despite this, profits still fell—highlighting that revenue pressure, not costs, is the real issue. <h3>Loan Book: Safer Mix, Smaller Size</h3> Total AUM shrank: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> FY24: ₹438 crore </li> <li> FY25: ₹390 crore </li> </ul> But the composition improved: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Gold Loans: 50% of Advances  </li> <li> Vehicle Loans: 27%  </li> <li> Microfinance: 16%  </li> </ul> The strategy is clear: shift toward secured, lower-risk lending—even if it means slower growth. <h3>The Real Red Flag: Asset Quality</h3> Gross NPAs stand at ₹37.1 crore, or 9.5% of whole loan book—high for comfort. The stress is concentrated: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Vehicle loans: GNPA of 23.1% </li> <li> Microfinance: GNPA of 17.4% </li> </ul> Gold loans, however, remain extremely stable. The legacy vehicle and microfinance book is hurting returns and absorbing provisions. <h3>Physical Footprint</h3> The company operates 139 branches, largely concentrated in: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Kerala (78) </li> <li> Karnataka (50) </li> </ul> Plus: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> 8 microfinance hubs </li> <li> 7 auto loan hubs </li> </ul> This southern focus aligns well with gold-loan-led lending. <h3>The UnlistedZone Take</h3> This is a classic case of stability over speed. The NBFC is deliberately shrinking risky portfolios, cutting costs, and leaning into gold loans. That makes the balance sheet safer—but also caps growth and profitability in the near term. If asset quality in vehicle and microfinance loans improves, earnings could stabilise. If not, expect profits to remain muted despite strong capital buffers. Safe? Yes. High-growth? Not yet.

Read →301 views

Blog5 Jan 2026

Boundless Capital Bets on JSR Dynamics: Inside the Defence-Tech Deal

Boundless Capital has made a minority investment in JSR Dynamics, an Indian defence-tech company building precision-guided munitions and airborne weapon systems. With strong leadership, in-house IP, marquee partnerships, and a growing defence order book, JSR is well placed to ride India’s Atmanirbhar Bharat defence push. <h2>The News</h2> Boundless Capital has announced a minority investment in JSR Dynamics Private Limited, a fast-growing Indian defence company focused on advanced airborne weapon systems and precision-guided munitions. The investment will primarily support: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Expansion of manufacturing capacity (capex) </li> <li> Development of new, next-generation defence products </li> </ul> This marks another deal where Boundless is backing a mission-critical business at a key inflection point. <h2>Who Is JSR Dynamics?</h2> JSR Dynamics is headquartered in Nagpur, Maharashtra, with advanced manufacturing infrastructure, including a newly commissioned plant in Yelahanka (Bengaluru). The company designs and manufactures high-end defence solutions such as: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Long Range Glide Bombs (LRGBs) </li> <li> Range Extension Kits </li> <li> Lightweight Cruise Missiles </li> <li> Loitering Munitions </li> </ul> In short: these are the kinds of systems that modern air forces use for precision strikes with minimal collateral damage. <h2>Leadership That Matters</h2> JSR is led by Air Marshal (Retd) Shirish B. Deo, former Vice Chief of the Indian Air Force. Why this is important: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Deep understanding of operational defence requirements </li> <li> Strong credibility with armed forces and policymakers </li> <li> Ability to bridge the gap between battlefield needs and indigenous R&D </li> </ul> Defence is a trust-driven sector—and leadership like this materially lowers execution risk. <h2>Strong Moats: IP + Partnerships</h2> JSR Dynamics isn’t just assembling products—it owns in-house intellectual property. It also has strategic partnerships with: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) </li> <li> IIT Madras </li> <li> Munitions India Limited </li> <li> Indian Armed Forces </li> </ul> These relationships strengthen both product development and order visibility, which is critical in defence manufacturing. <h2>The Order Book Story</h2> JSR already has a robust and diversified order book, spanning: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> DRDO programs </li> <li> ISRO-linked initiatives </li> <li> Indian Navy and Air Force contracts </li> </ul> Add to that: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> iDEX awards (government-backed defence innovation programs) </li> <li> Strong contract wins and growth momentum </li> </ul> This signals not just R&D success—but actual commercial and strategic adoption. <h2>Why This Deal Makes Sense Now</h2> India’s defence ecosystem is undergoing a structural shift: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Rising defence budgets </li> <li> Clear policy push for Atmanirbhar Bharat </li> <li> Reduced reliance on imports </li> <li> Preference for indigenous, IP-led platforms </li> </ul> JSR Dynamics sits right at the intersection of these tailwinds. Boundless Capital’s investment is effectively a bet on: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> India’s long-term defence indigenisation story </li> <li> A scaled-up domestic supplier of advanced weapon systems </li> </ul> <h2>A Quick Look at the Financial Reality</h2> While JSR’s strategic positioning and order momentum are strong, its financials tell an important early-stage story. Over FY22–FY24, reported revenue from core operations remains negligible, reflecting that the company is still transitioning from development and prototyping into scaled execution. That said, operating performance has been improving: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> EBITDA has turned positive and expanded sharply, rising from a modest ₹6 Lakhs in FY22 to ₹768 Lakhs in FY23 and ₹870 La khsin FY24, indicating better cost absorption and operating leverage as programs progress. </li> <li> EBIT moved from negative territory in FY22 to positive in FY23 and FY24, though it is still not consistently strong enough to absorb finance costs and depreciation on its own. </li> </ul> The more revealing piece is Other Income. In FY24, other income (₹1,080 Lakhs) exceeded EBITDA (₹870 Lakhs). Without this, profits before tax would have been deeply negative. In FY22 and FY23 as well, other income played a meaningful role in offsetting weak or early-stage operating profits and finance costs. This suggests that: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> The current bottom line is heavily supported by non-operating income (such as interest income, grants, investments, or one-offs). </li> <li> Core defence manufacturing operations are still in the ramp-up phase, not yet mature enough to independently sustain profitability. </li> </ul> This is typical for defence-tech companies ahead of large-scale production—but it also explains why fresh capital for capex and execution matters now. <h2>The UnlistedZone Take</h2> Defence-tech is no longer just a public-sector story. Private players like JSR Dynamics—with strong leadership, proprietary technology, and real orders—are emerging as critical pillars of India’s defence modernisation. Boundless Capital’s minority investment looks less like a financial punt and more like a strategic alignment with a company building for national importance. Bottom line: As India arms itself for the future, companies like JSR Dynamics are quietly becoming indispensable.

Read →1.1K views

Blog3 Jan 2026

Why a Company with 100+ Patents is Struggling with Cash Flow

Read →796 views

Blog1 Jan 2026

Edelweiss–WestBridge Deal: Smart Monetisation or Expensive Bet?

Edelweiss Financial Services has sold 10% of Edelweiss Asset Management (AMC) to WestBridge Capital, as part of a larger transaction that values the AMC at ~₹3,000 crore. WestBridge will eventually acquire up to 15% for ₹450 crore, with the remaining stake to be transferred by March 2026. The real question: Is this valuation justified given Edelweiss AMC’s AUM and profitability? <h2>What exactly happened?</h2> <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Date of transfer: 17 December </li> <li> Stake sold: 10% (additional 5% to follow) </li> <li> Buyers: WestBridge affiliates — Setu AIF Trust, Konark Trust, MMPL Trust </li> <li> Regulatory approvals: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> CCI: 21 October </li> <li> SEBI: 12 November </li> </ul> </li> <li> Investor exit window: Closed on 2 December </li> </ul> This was a fully regulator-approved transaction with no structural surprises. <h2>Financials Performance in Crores</h2> <h2><img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1767701561.jpg" alt="" width="50%" /></h2> <h2>Key numbers at a glance</h2> <h2><img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1767701593.jpg" alt="" width="50%" /></h2> <h2>Why WestBridge is interested</h2> WestBridge manages $7+ billion in AUM globally and typically invests in: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Scaled financial platforms </li> <li> Predictable cash-generating businesses </li> <li> Long-term structural growth stories </li> </ul> Edelweiss AMC fits this profile well: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Profitable asset management platform </li> <li> Strong equity AUM growth </li> <li> Diversified products (Mutual Funds, AIFs, PMS) </li> <li> Operating leverage beginning to reflect in profits </li> </ul> In simple terms, WestBridge is backing India’s rising equity participation trend. <h2>The valuation debate: Is 57x P/E too expensive?</h2> <h3>Re-rating the deal with FY26E PAT of ₹90 crore</h3> The initial narrative around the deal focused on a ~57x P/E, derived from FY25 PAT of ₹53 crore. However, management guidance and operating leverage point to a FY26E PAT of ~₹90 crore, which meaningfully changes the valuation picture. <img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1767701614.jpg" alt="" width="50%" /> At ~33x FY26E earnings, Edelweiss AMC no longer looks expensive. Instead, it starts to look undervalued relative to listed peers, especially given its growth trajectory. <h2>Industry comparison: How Edelweiss stacks up against listed AMCs</h2> A forward-looking comparison puts the valuation into sharper context. <img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1767701632.jpg" alt="" width="50%" /> What stands out: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Edelweiss AMC trades at the moderate forward P/E of 33x among major peers </li> <li> Larger AMCs enjoy scale stability, yet command 20–40x forward earnings </li> <li> Edelweiss, despite smaller AUM, is growing faster in equity assets, justifying convergence in multiples over time </li> </ul> This comparison strongly suggests that WestBridge entered at a conservative forward multiple. <h2>AUM-based sanity check (the more relevant lens)</h2> AMCs are often valued as a percentage of Assets Under Management, not just earnings. <h2><img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1767701652.jpg" alt="" width="50%" /></h2> <h2>Is the ₹3,000 crore valuation justified?</h2> Looking at the deal through multiple lenses, the answer increasingly tilts towards yes. <h3>1. Forward earnings justify the price</h3> At a valuation of ₹3,000 crore and FY26E PAT of ₹90 crore, Edelweiss AMC is valued at ~33x forward earnings. This is: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Lower than all listed peers in the industry comparison </li> <li> Conservative for a business delivering 30%+ equity AUM growth </li> </ul> In effect, WestBridge is paying less for future profits than what the market assigns to mature AMCs today. <h3>2. AUM-based valuation is within comfort zone</h3> Within the industry's standard valuation range of 5-15% of AUM, Edelweiss AMC sits at ~1.9%, compared to HDFC AMC's ~8% valuation on its ₹12 lakh crore AUM with a Market Capitalization of More than 1 lakh Crore. Given Edelweiss AMC  increasing equity mix and improving margins, a move towards the upper end of this band over time is plausible.  <h3>3. Scale-up optionality is not fully priced in</h3> Despite strong growth, Edelweiss AMC operates at a much smaller scale than peers. As AUM scales up: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Fixed costs flatten </li> <li> Margins expand </li> <li> PAT compounds faster than AUM </li> </ul> The current valuation does not fully price in this operating leverage. <h3>4. Downside protection for the buyer</h3> Even if growth moderates, the entry multiple of ~33x FY26E relative to peers trading at 20–40x. This asymmetry—limited downside, meaningful upside—makes the valuation attractive for a long-term investor. <h3>Why Edelweiss chose to sell now</h3> This deal is not a full exit—it is strategic monetisation. <img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1767701671.jpg" alt="" width="50%" /> Edelweiss is effectively reducing risk while retaining upside. <h2>Why WestBridge is comfortable paying up</h2> WestBridge is not buying current earnings—it is buying: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Sustained equity AUM growth </li> <li> Margin expansion as scale improves </li> <li> Future earnings compounding </li> </ul> <h2>Final verdict: Reasonable or not?</h2> <h3><img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1767701693.jpg" alt="" width="50%" /></h3> <h3>Bottom line</h3> This is not a bargain deal. It is a growth-priced, conviction-led transaction. Edelweiss monetised its AMC at the right time. WestBridge is betting that India’s asset management growth runway is far from over. In asset management, AUM growth—not current profits—ultimately decides who’s right.

Read →400 views

All blogs