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Blog15 Dec 2025

Elecbits raises $5.5 Mn — and quietly takes on India’s biggest hardware bottleneck

Building hardware in India has never been easy. Designs take months to iterate. Components come from scattered vendors. Quality checks are opaque. And by the time a product is production‑ready, the market has already moved on. Gurugram‑based Elecbits thinks this is exactly what’s broken — and it just raised $5.5 Mn (~₹49 Cr) to fix it. <h3>The funding announcement: what just happened</h3> Electronics design and manufacturing startup Elecbits has raised Series A funding led by Nexus Venture Partners, with participation from SE Ventures and Riverwalk Holdings. The capital will be used to: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Scale its AI‑powered electronics platform, Elecbits XOR </li> <li> Expand in‑house design and manufacturing capabilities </li> <li> Support international expansion as a China+1 electronics partner </li> </ul> Founded in 2019 by Saurav Kumar Singh and Nikhil Rawat, Elecbits is positioning itself as a full‑stack operating system for electronics hardware. <h3>The real problem with building hardware in India</h3> Unlike software, hardware doesn’t live in one place. Design, prototyping, sourcing, PCB fabrication, assembly, testing, and final manufacturing usually sit with different vendors, each with their own timelines and incentives. The result? <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Long time‑to‑market </li> <li> Limited visibility on costs and risks </li> <li> Quality issues discovered too late </li> </ul> As Elecbits puts it, hardware engineering has been stuck with non‑standardised processes and opaque supply chains. <h3>Elecbits’ answer to the mess: the XOR platform</h3> Elecbits’ answer is XOR — a vertically integrated platform that connects the entire electronics lifecycle. Think of it as a single stack that handles: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Electronics design and engineering </li> <li> Prototyping </li> <li> Component sourcing </li> <li> PCB fabrication and assembly </li> <li> Quality checks </li> <li> Final product manufacturing </li> </ul> Powered by AI, XOR offers instant quotes, part intelligence, supply‑chain transparency, and risk management tools, helping enterprises move from prototype to mass production faster. In short: fewer hand‑offs, fewer surprises. <h3>Who’s already betting on Elecbits’ hardware stack?</h3> The startup already works with 200+ companies, including: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Panasonic </li> <li> Schneider Electric </li> <li> Motherson </li> <li> Maruti Suzuki </li> <li> OLA </li> <li> Urban Company </li> <li> Zetwerk </li> <li> Valeo </li> </ul> Its hardware powers fast‑growing segments like: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Digital payments </li> <li> Power electronics </li> <li> IT hardware </li> <li> Automotive electronics </li> <li> Consumer electronics </li> </ul> <h3>Why investors think Elecbits can fix a foundational gap</h3> Nexus Venture Partners believes the problem Elecbits is tackling is structural. As partner Anand Datta puts it: <blockquote> “The world runs on hardware, yet the infrastructure to build it remains inefficient — especially in India.” </blockquote> Elecbits isn’t building just another factory. It’s building infrastructure — digital and physical — to make India competitive at a global scale. <h3>The bigger context: India’s aggressive electronics manufacturing push</h3> The timing matters. India is aggressively pushing electronics manufacturing through schemes like: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Production‑Linked Incentive (PLI) </li> <li> Electronics Component Manufacturing Scheme (ECMS) </li> </ul> Earlier this year, the government received ₹1.15 lakh crore worth of proposals under ECMS — almost 2× the original target. And startups like Elecbits are filling a crucial gap: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Design capability </li> <li> Component integration </li> <li> Supply‑chain execution </li> </ul> Without these layers, incentives alone don’t translate into scalable manufacturing. <h3>The UnlistedZone takeaway: why this round actually matters</h3> India doesn’t lack demand for electronics. What it has lacked is speed, coordination, and visibility in hardware execution. Elecbits is betting that if you fix the plumbing — the tools, workflows, and supply chains — hardware can finally move at software‑like speed. And if it works, India won’t just assemble electronics. It’ll engineer them end‑to‑end.

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Blog12 Dec 2025

FNS International: The Premium Cutlery King That’s Losing Its Shine

India loves its shiny spoons. For over 15 years, one homegrown brand has quietly ruled the premium stainless-steel cutlery and tableware space — FNS International. Designer dinner sets in 5-star hotels? FNS. That sleek spoon in your Myntra gift box? Probably FNS. From Taj to Amazon, everyone stocks it. The brand is strong, the distribution is wide, and the company is finally preparing for an IPO. But the numbers? They’re telling a very different story. <h2>The Growth That Wasn’t</h2> <table style="width: 35.0317%;"> <tbody> <tr> <th style="width: 23.6649%; text-align: center;">Year</th> <th style="width: 25.5137%; text-align: center;">Revenue</th> <th style="width: 30.3207%; text-align: center;">PAT</th> <th style="width: 20.337%; text-align: center;">Net Margin</th> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 23.6649%; text-align: center;">2024</td> <td style="width: 25.5137%; text-align: center;">₹67 Cr</td> <td style="width: 30.3207%; text-align: center;">₹3 Cr</td> <td style="width: 20.337%; text-align: center;">4.38%</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 23.6649%; text-align: center;">2025</td> <td style="width: 25.5137%; text-align: center;">₹74 Cr</td> <td style="width: 30.3207%; text-align: center;">₹1.1Cr</td> <td style="width: 20.337%; text-align: center;">1.5%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Revenue grew just 7.4% — the slowest in years. </li> <li> Profit crashed 63%. </li> <li> Operating margin dropped from 10.2% → 7.3%. </li> <li> EBITDA fell from ₹6.9 Cr → ₹5.4 Cr. </li> </ul> <h2>Why Does Profit Fall Even After Revenue Rises?</h2> <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Revenue Up by ₹6 Cr (67→74 Cr) → Good </li> <li> But Costs Rose Faster: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Materials: +₹2.5 Cr (38→40.5 Cr) </li> <li> Employees: +₹1.7 Cr (14.7→16.4 Cr) → This grew faster than revenue </li> <li> Only these two costs ate up ~70% of the new revenue. </li> </ul> </li> <li> Other hidden expenses (overheads, interest, taxes, etc.) likely also increased, pushing total expense growth beyond the ₹6 Cr revenue gain. </li> <li> Result: Profit margins get compressed — more money comes in, but even more money goes out, leading to lower profit. </li> </ul> <h2>Profitability Under Pressure – Margin Analysis</h2> <h3>Key Metrics (FY24 → FY25):</h3> <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Gross Margin: 55% → 51.50% </li> <li> EBITDA Margin: 10.20% → 7.30% </li> <li> PAT Margin: 4.40% → 1.50% </li> </ul> <h3>What’s Happening:</h3> 1. Cost of Sales is Rising Faster Than Revenue (Gross Margin Decline: -3.5%) <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Even with higher sales, raw material or direct production costs are increasing at a higher rate </li> <li> Shows fundamental pricing pressure or input cost inflation </li> </ul> 2. Operational Inefficiency is Growing (EBITDA Margin Decline: -2.9%) <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Operating expenses (employee costs, admin, other overheads) are rising sharply </li> <li> Each rupee of revenue now carries heavier operational burden </li> </ul> 3. Profit is Getting Squeezed from All Sides (PAT Margin Collapse: -2.9%) <ul data-spread="false"> <li> The combined effect of higher production costs AND higher operating expenses </li> <li> Further impacted by potential interest costs, depreciation, or taxes </li> <li> From every ₹100 of revenue, only ₹1.50 remains as profit vs. ₹4.40 previously </li> </ul> <h2>The Cash Burn Story</h2> <table style="width: 45.2643%;"> <tbody> <tr> <td style="width: 14.9157%; text-align: center;">Year</td> <td style="width: 28.766%; text-align: center;">Cash from Operations</td> <td style="width: 27.9579%; text-align: center;">Net Cash Generated</td> <td style="width: 28.5088%; text-align: center;">Cash at Year End</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 14.9157%; text-align: center;">2024</td> <td style="width: 28.766%; text-align: center;">–₹1 Cr</td> <td style="width: 27.9579%; text-align: center;">–₹1.2 Cr</td> <td style="width: 28.5088%; text-align: center;">₹1 Cr</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 14.9157%; text-align: center;">2025</td> <td style="width: 28.766%; text-align: center;">-₹1.4 Cr</td> <td style="width: 27.9579%; text-align: center;">–₹0.8 Cr</td> <td style="width: 28.5088%; text-align: center;">₹0.2 Cr</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <ul data-spread="false"> <li> FY25 operating cash flow improved only because they squeezed suppliers. </li> <li> The company is still burning cash every year. </li> <li> Cash balance has collapsed from ₹2.18 Cr → ₹0.17 Cr in just two years. </li> </ul> <h2>Where Did the Money Go?</h2> Working capital is eating the business alive. <table style="width: 50.0796%;"> <tbody> <tr> <td style="width: 38.8456%; text-align: center;">Item</td> <td style="width: 24.9722%; text-align: center;">2024</td> <td style="width: 18.9183%; text-align: center;">2025</td> <td style="width: 17.1526%; text-align: center;">Change</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 38.8456%; text-align: center;">Inventory</td> <td style="width: 24.9722%; text-align: center;">₹25.3 Cr</td> <td style="width: 18.9183%; text-align: center;">₹30 Cr</td> <td style="width: 17.1526%; text-align: center;">+₹4.7 Cr</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 38.8456%; text-align: center;">Trade Receivables</td> <td style="width: 24.9722%; text-align: center;">₹23 Cr</td> <td style="width: 18.9183%; text-align: center;">₹22 Cr</td> <td style="width: 17.1526%; text-align: center;">Almost flat</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 38.8456%; text-align: center;">Trade Payables</td> <td style="width: 24.9722%; text-align: center;">₹11.38 Cr</td> <td style="width: 18.9183%; text-align: center;">₹11.2 Cr</td> <td style="width: 17.1526%; text-align: center;"> -₹0.18Cr</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> Key takeaways: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Inventory is piling up. </li> <li> Receivables aren’t improving. </li> <li> They’re paying suppliers faster. </li> </ul> This is the classic working capital trap. <h2>Balance Sheet: Looks Safe, But…</h2> <table style="width: 40.0878%;"> <tbody> <tr> <td style="width: 33.6904%; text-align: center;">Item</td> <td style="width: 37.0241%; text-align: center;">2024</td> <td style="width: 29.1534%; text-align: center;">2025</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 33.6904%; text-align: center;">Borrowings</td> <td style="width: 37.0241%; text-align: center;">₹24 Cr</td> <td style="width: 29.1534%; text-align: center;">₹28 Cr</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 33.6904%; text-align: center;">Cash</td> <td style="width: 37.0241%; text-align: center;">₹0.96 Cr</td> <td style="width: 29.1534%; text-align: center;">₹0.17 Cr</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 33.6904%; text-align: center;">Shareholders Fund </td> <td style="width: 37.0241%; text-align: center;">₹15.2 Cr</td> <td style="width: 29.1534%; text-align: center;">₹16.3 Cr</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 33.6904%; text-align: center;">Debt/Equity</td> <td style="width: 37.0241%; text-align: center;">1.5×</td> <td style="width: 29.1534%; text-align: center;">1.7×</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> Debt increased 4 Cr, while profits collapsed. Interest cost shot up from ₹2.1 Cr → ₹2.7 Cr, eating whatever profit was left. <h2>What’s Going Right?</h2> <ul data-spread="false"> <li> One of India’s strongest premium cutlery brands </li> <li> 3,500+ retail outlets + modern trade + e-commerce presence </li> <li> Strong hospitality segment with sticky institutional clients </li> <li> In-house manufacturing with quality control </li> <li> Backed by Ankit Mittal and Mavua Capital (₹3 Cr pre-IPO) in 2024. </li> </ul> <h2>What’s Going Terribly Wrong?</h2> <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Growth has stalled </li> <li> Margins are collapsing </li> <li> Working capital inefficiency is killing cash flows </li> <li> Debt is rising fast </li> <li> Profit fell 63% in one year, with no recovery in sight </li> </ul>

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Blog11 Dec 2025

AB InBev India: Big Brand, Bigger Losses — What’s Brewing Behind the Numbers?

If you've ever sipped a Budweiser at a house party, grabbed a Corona at a club, or spotted a Hoegaarden on a premium restaurant shelf, you’ve already met the king of global beer — AB InBev. Globally, AB InBev is a behemoth. It owns 500+ brands, operates across continents, and calls itself the world’s largest beer maker. But in India, the story is far more complicated. Despite being the second-largest player in India’s beer market, revenue scale isn’t translating into profits — yet. Let’s break it down. <h3>A) The Brand Empire in India</h3> AB InBev India houses household names: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Core segment: Haywards, Knock Out, Royal Challenge (~73% of FY20 revenue historically) </li> <li> Premium: Budweiser (core, Magnum, Super Premium), Stella Artois, Corona, Hoegaarden (~20% historically) </li> <li> Imports/craft niche: Hoegaarden 0.0, Budweiser 0.0, Beck’s Ice </li> </ul> Their India strategy? Push premium. Because premium beer = premium margins. <h3>B) The Numbers Tell a Different Story</h3> <table dir="ltr" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" data-sheets-root="1" data-sheets-baot="1"><colgroup><col width="100" /><col width="100" /><col width="100" /><col width="100" /></colgroup> <tbody> <tr> <td>Particulars</td> <td>FY23</td> <td>FY24</td> <td>FY25</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Revenue</td> <td>₹6,177 Cr</td> <td>₹7,302 Cr</td> <td>₹7,890 Cr</td> </tr> <tr> <td>EBITDA</td> <td>-₹187 Cr</td> <td>-₹286 Cr</td> <td>-₹24 Cr</td> </tr> <tr> <td>PAT</td> <td>-₹438 Cr</td> <td>-₹591 Cr</td> <td>-₹356 Cr</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> Revenue is clearly rising — ₹1,700 Cr added in two years. But profits? Still negative. The good news: Losses and negative EBITDA are shrinking sharply in FY25. The operating performance is improving, helped by: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Better product mix (more premium, less mass) </li> <li> Higher gross margins (up to 77.35% in FY25) </li> <li> Brand positioning and pricing power </li> </ul> The challenge: Overheads, regulatory costs, state taxes, logistics, and capital-heavy manufacturing continue to drag profitability. <h3>C) Balance Sheet Check: Debt-Fueled Survival?</h3> <table dir="ltr" style="border-collapse: collapse; width: 53.2363%; border-color: #000000; border-style: solid;" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" data-sheets-root="1" data-sheets-baot="1"><colgroup><col style="width: 24.9981%;" width="100" /><col style="width: 24.9981%;" width="100" /><col style="width: 24.9981%;" width="100" /><col style="width: 24.9981%;" width="100" /></colgroup> <tbody> <tr> <td>Particulars (cr)</td> <td>FY25</td> <td>FY24</td> <td>FY23</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FIxed Assets</td> <td>1518</td> <td>1434</td> <td>1094</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Inventories</td> <td>867</td> <td>799</td> <td>1046</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Trade Receiveables</td> <td>643</td> <td>617</td> <td>614</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total Assets</td> <td>3693</td> <td>3378</td> <td>3388</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Share Capital</td> <td>1016</td> <td>928</td> <td>928</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ReseRve and Surplus</td> <td>-775</td> <td>-779</td> <td>-190</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Borrowings</td> <td>1665</td> <td>1589</td> <td>926</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> Debt continues climbing as the company scales, but FY25 shows signs of stabilization. <h3>D) Cash Flow: Improving but Not Yet Comfortable</h3> <table dir="ltr" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" data-sheets-root="1" data-sheets-baot="1"><colgroup><col width="100" /><col width="100" /><col width="100" /><col width="100" /></colgroup> <tbody> <tr> <td>Particulars (cr)</td> <td>FY25</td> <td>FY24</td> <td>FY23</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CFO</td> <td>-66</td> <td>-311</td> <td>-594</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CFI</td> <td>-237</td> <td>-210</td> <td>-31</td> </tr> <tr> <td>CFF</td> <td>280</td> <td>474</td> <td>761</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Net Cash Generated</td> <td>-22</td> <td>-48</td> <td>136</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cash at end</td> <td>117</td> <td>139</td> <td>187</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> Operating cash flow has improved dramatically, shifting from deep negative territory toward breakeven. This suggests one thing: the turnaround is building momentum. Investment activity increased again in FY25 — likely bottling expansion, automation, and premium production capability <h3>E) So, Why Is AB InBev Struggling in India?</h3> <table dir="ltr" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" data-sheets-root="1" data-sheets-baot="1"><colgroup><col width="100" /><col width="100" /><col width="100" /></colgroup> <tbody> <tr> <td>Particulars (cr)</td> <td>FY25</td> <td>FY24</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Revenue from operations</td> <td>7890</td> <td>7302</td> </tr> <tr> <td>a) Beer</td> <td>3443</td> <td>2990</td> </tr> <tr> <td>b) Beverages other than beer</td> <td>14</td> <td>85</td> </tr> <tr> <td>c) Excise duty collected from customers</td> <td>4383</td> <td>4179</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> Three words: Regulation. Distribution. Excise. Beer in India is taxed almost like a sin product, and excise contributes a massive chunk of revenue (₹4,383 Cr in FY25 alone). Combine that with state-by-state policies, price control, and expensive logistics, and margins evaporate faster than foam on a hot pint. <h3>F) The Turning Point</h3> Despite the challenges, FY25 indicates a shift: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Gross margins hit an all-time high </li> <li> EBITDA loss nearly wiped out </li> <li> Cash burn sharply reduced </li> <li> Premium demand continues rising, especially among millennials </li> </ul> India is moving from “beer = cheap drink” to “beer = lifestyle choice.” That shift plays directly into AB InBev’s strongest territory. <h3>The Bigger Picture</h3> AB InBev India’s story isn’t about short‑term profit—it’s about category creation and premium market shaping. With: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Gross margins climbing </li> <li> Operating losses almost eliminated </li> <li> Investments continuing in premium expansion </li> </ul> The company seems positioning for a long‑term payoff. <h3>Final Sip</h3> AB InBev India isn’t profitable yet — but it's closer than ever. This is a classic scale-first-profit-later story. If current trends continue: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Premium beers scale further </li> <li> Operating leverage kicks in </li> <li> Debt stabilizes </li> <li> Distribution efficiencies improve </li> </ul> Then AB InBev could finally turn its Indian business from a volume game to a margin engine. 2

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Blog10 Dec 2025

Inox Clean Energy Pauses Its IPO — But the Story Is Getting Bigger

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Blog10 Dec 2025

Green Hydrogen’s Moment: Global Momentum, India’s Push

Green hydrogen is stepping into the global spotlight—and fast. The global green hydrogen market, valued at USD 12.31 billion in 2025, is expected to surge to USD 199.22 billion by 2034 at a massive 41.46% CAGR. Falling renewable costs, rapid technology upgrades, and urgent decarbonisation needs are driving this rise. Hard-to-abate sectors like steel, shipping, and aviation are increasingly turning to hydrogen. <h3>India’s Green Hydrogen Push</h3> India aims to become a global hydrogen hub under the National Green Hydrogen Mission, targeting 5 MMTPA production by 2030 supported by over ₹8 lakh crore in investments. Key highlights: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> 125 GW renewable energy capacity dedicated to hydrogen. </li> <li> Green Hydrogen Certification Scheme for credible carbon-intensity standards. </li> <li> Increased R&D support and deeper global partnerships. </li> <li> A strong push under the Atmanirbhar Bharat vision. </li> </ul> <h3>Goodluck Green Energy’s Big Update</h3> <img src="https://unlistedzone.com/storage/knowledge-logo/app_image-1765366895.jpg" alt="" width="80%" /> Turning to Goodluck Green Energy journey, here are  significant updates: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Their green hydrogen facility in Kachchh, Gujarat is likely to be operational-ready for trial production by Q4 FY 2025-26. </li> <li> This innovative waste-to-hydrogen project simultaneously supports sustainable waste management and zero-carbon energy production. </li> <li> It positions them as a pioneer in the circular economy-driven hydrogen space, strengthening our footprint in India’s rapidly expanding green hydrogen ecosystem. </li> </ul> <h3>Global Spotlight: COP30 and Belém 4X Initiative</h3> At COP30 in Belém, Brazil (Nov 2025), green hydrogen gained strong global backing. Over 20 nations, including India, signed the Belém 4X Initiative, committing to quadruple sustainable fuel usage—biofuels, biogas, hydrogen—by 2035. What it means: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Focused climate action on high-emission sectors. </li> <li> Strong emphasis on energy efficiency and electrification. </li> </ul> <h3>Why Hydrogen Matters</h3> <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Helps tackle renewable intermittency through long-duration storage. </li> <li> Improves energy security by reducing fossil fuel imports. </li> <li> Drives deep decarbonisation in sectors where electrification alone falls short.. </li> </ul> <h3>The Bottom Line</h3> Global commitments, national policies, and corporate innovation are accelerating green hydrogen’s rise. With projects like Goodluck Green Energy’s facility moving toward commissioning, India is set to strengthen its presence in the global hydrogen landscape.

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Blog8 Dec 2025

BREAKING NEWS: JioStar Abandons $3 Billion ICC Deal Amid Massive Losses - IPL's Future Valuation in Jeopardy

In a dramatic development that threatens to reshape India's cricket broadcasting landscape, Reliance Industries-controlled JioStar has formally notified the International Cricket Council (ICC) that it cannot service the remaining two years of its four-year India media-rights deal due to deep financial losses, according to a report by Economic Times. The media conglomerate has more than doubled its provisions for expected losses on sports contracts to a staggering ₹25,760 crore in 2024-25, up from ₹12,319 crore the previous year - a clear signal that the economics of cricket broadcasting in India have fundamentally broken down. <h2 data-source-line="9-9">The Immediate Crisis</h2> The ICC has scrambled into emergency mode, launching a fresh sale process for India media rights for 2026-29 and seeking approximately $2.4 billion. The original 2024-27 cycle was valued at $3 billion. However, early indications suggest the market has evaporated. The ICC has approached Sony Pictures Networks India (SPNI), Netflix, and Amazon Prime Video to take over the rights. So far, none of the platforms has shown substantive interest because of pricing concerns, leaving the ICC without a clear path forward. This represents an unprecedented collapse in what has traditionally been the world's most lucrative cricket market. <h2 data-source-line="17-17">Why the IPL Should Be Deeply Worried</h2> <h3 id="1.-the-%E2%82%B948%2C390-crore-question" tabindex="-1" data-source-line="19-19">1. The ₹48,390 Crore Question</h3> JioStar inherited not just the ICC deal but also paid over $6 billion (₹48,390+ crore) for IPL digital and TV rights for 2023-2027. If they're hemorrhaging money on the $3 billion ICC contract, the IPL deal—which cost twice as much—must be under catastrophic financial strain. It reveals that "JioStar inherited the $3 billion ICC India rights from Disney's Star India, which later merged with Viacom18. Together, Star and Viacom18 had committed more than $10 billion to cricket, making India the world's most expensive market for the sport." This ₹80,000+ crore cricket bet is now unraveling spectacularly. <h3 id="2.-the-%E2%82%B97%2C000-crore-black-hole" tabindex="-1" data-source-line="27-27">2. The ₹7,000 Crore Black Hole</h3> The critical vulnerability: "JioStar's strain has intensified after the ban on real-money gaming, which had become the single largest advertiser for cricket. Industry executives said that although traditional brands have returned, no segment can fill the roughly $840 million (₹7,000 crore) gap left by real-money gaming and fantasy platforms like Dream11 and My11Circle." This isn't just an ICC problem—the IPL relied on the same gaming platforms. Dream11 was a title sponsor and primary advertiser. That revenue fountain has been permanently shut off, and traditional advertisers cannot fill the void. <h3 id="3.-the-valuation-bubble-has-burst" tabindex="-1" data-source-line="33-33">3. The Valuation Bubble Has Burst</h3> The ET article reveals the extent of overpayment: "From the outset, several senior executives regarded the $3 billion ICC rights valuation as anomalous and materially disconnected from prevailing market benchmarks. SPNI had bid about $1.4 billion for the combined TV and digital rights, while Viacom18 was understood to have bid around $1 billion." Star/JioStar paid more than double what competitors thought the rights were worth. If ICC rights were overvalued by 100-150%, what does that say about IPL rights that cost twice as much? <h3 id="4.-the-duopoly-death-trap" tabindex="-1" data-source-line="39-39">4. The Duopoly Death Trap</h3> "The merger of Star India and Viacom18 into JioStar has created a virtual duopoly in sports broadcasting, leaving only JioStar and SPNI as serious contenders and narrowing options for rights holders such as the ICC." This is devastating for IPL's next auction (post-2027). In a healthy market, competition drives prices up. Now there are only two bidders: <ul data-source-line="44-46"> <li data-source-line="44-44">JioStar - currently bleeding money and unlikely to bid aggressively</li> <li data-source-line="45-46">Sony - has maintained a conservative approach and sub-licensed rights to reduce risk</li> </ul> Netflix and Amazon have explicitly stayed away. When IPL rights come up for renewal after 2027, who will bid? <h3 id="5.-the-profitability-death-spiral" tabindex="-1" data-source-line="49-49">5. The Profitability Death Spiral</h3>  What industry insiders feared: "Monetisation of bilateral and multilateral cricket remains limited amid subdued advertising demand and continued pressure on linear TV profitability from a shrinking pay base and weak ad volumes and pricing. With linear profits under strain and streaming still loss-making, broadcasters are reluctant to take on large sports commitments in the future." Both traditional TV and streaming are losing money. There's no profitable business model left for expensive cricket rights. <h3 id="6.-the-currency-catastrophe" tabindex="-1" data-source-line="55-55">6. The Currency Catastrophe</h3> "Rising dollar rates and rupee depreciation have added to the pressure because ICC payments are dollar denominated. Executives said JioStar's effective burden has already risen to about $3.3 billion as the dollar has crossed ₹90." If the rupee continues weakening, any dollar-denominated sports rights become increasingly expensive. This adds a 10% premium to already unprofitable deals. <h3 id="7.-the-zee-arbitration-disaster" tabindex="-1" data-source-line="61-61">7. The Zee Arbitration Disaster</h3> "JioStar's burden increased further after Zee Entertainment backed out of its commitment to take the ICC TV rights for roughly $1.5 billion when the proposed Zee-SPNI merger collapsed. This prompted JioStar to initiate arbitration against Zee at the London International Arbitration Centre, with damages claimed at close to $1 billion." Even when JioStar tried to offload part of the burden, it failed. They're now stuck in billion-dollar litigation, further draining resources. <h2 data-source-line="67-67">What This Means for IPL Stakeholders</h2> <h3 id="for-team-owners%3A" tabindex="-1" data-source-line="69-69">1. For Team Owners:</h3> Your franchise valuations are based on perpetually increasing media rights. If the next IPL rights deal (post-2027) comes in significantly lower than ₹48,390 crore, team valuations could collapse by 30-50%. <h3 id="for-players%3A" tabindex="-1" data-source-line="72-72">2. For Players:</h3> Mega-auctions and inflated player salaries are funded by media rights revenue. A correction in broadcast deals means smaller salary caps and reduced player earnings. <h3 id="for-bcci%3A" tabindex="-1" data-source-line="75-75">3. For BCCI:</h3> The board has built budgets and development programs around ever-increasing IPL revenues. A 30-40% reduction in the next rights cycle would force major cutbacks. <h3 id="for-investors%3A" tabindex="-1" data-source-line="78-78">4. For Investors:</h3> Private equity firms have poured billions into buying IPL teams at sky-high valuations. This news represents a massive markdown risk for those investments. <h2 data-source-line="94-94">The Only Silver Lining</h2> "That said, cricket continues to function as one of the few proven mass-scale audience drivers in India, making it a strategic asset that broadcasters and streamers are reluctant to forgo despite escalating costs." Cricket still delivers audiences. The question is: at what price can it be profitable? And that price appears to be far below what JioStar paid. <hr data-source-line="100-100" /> <h2 data-source-line="102-102">The Uncomfortable Truth</h2> The ICC crisis isn't a separate event—it's the first domino falling in India's cricket media bubble. This confirms that "the current sales process for fresh media rights underscores the correction underway in the sports media landscape." JioStar's ₹25,760 crore loss provision isn't just about ICC—it encompasses all their onerous sports contracts, including IPL. The company is essentially admitting that their entire cricket portfolio is underwater. When the IPL rights come up for renewal in 2027, the market dynamics will be: <ul data-source-line="109-115"> <li data-source-line="109-109">No gaming advertisers (₹7,000 crore revenue hole)</li> <li data-source-line="110-110">Only 2 potential bidders (down from 4-5 previously)</li> <li data-source-line="111-111">Both bidders currently losing money on cricket</li> <li data-source-line="112-112">Linear TV in terminal decline</li> <li data-source-line="113-113">Streaming unprofitable</li> <li data-source-line="114-115">Global streaming giants staying away</li> </ul>

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Blog6 Dec 2025

Inside Sterlite Grid 5’s Strategy: Why Resonia Was Formed and What FY24–25 Numbers Show

If you look only at Sterlite Grid 5’s consolidated P&L, you’ll see a big loss. But a closer reading reveals something very different. The Indian business is profitable. The trouble lies entirely in the old Brazil exposure. Here’s what the annual report actually tells us. <hr data-start="530" data-end="533" /> <h2 data-start="535" data-end="579">A Transmission Powerhouse at Its Core</h2> Sterlite Grid 5 (SGL 5) is the Sterlite Group’s dedicated transmission platform. It builds, owns and operates high-voltage networks and occasionally monetises them through sales to InvITs or institutional investors. The scale speaks for itself: <ul data-start="828" data-end="1098"> <li data-start="828" data-end="898"> 24 transmission projects (operational + in progress + flipped) </li> <li data-start="899" data-end="943"> ~13,671 ckm of lines and substations </li> <li data-start="944" data-end="995"> ₹52,844 crore invested across the portfolio </li> <li data-start="996" data-end="1041"> 4.5 GW renewable integration capacity </li> <li data-start="1042" data-end="1098"> 15% share in India’s private transmission market </li> </ul> Effectively, it runs a hybrid model: Stable annuity-like income from operating assets + EPC income + periodic asset monetisation. <hr data-start="1236" data-end="1239" /> <h2 data-start="1241" data-end="1302">The Financial Reality: India Positive, Brazil Negative</h2> <h3 data-start="1304" data-end="1353">Indian Business (continuing operations)</h3> Revenue <ul data-start="1369" data-end="1422"> <li data-start="1369" data-end="1395"> FY25 → ₹1,160.55 crore </li> <li data-start="1396" data-end="1422"> FY24 → ₹1,245.76 crore </li> </ul> EBITDA <ul data-start="1437" data-end="1485"> <li data-start="1437" data-end="1460"> FY25 → ₹97.01 crore </li> <li data-start="1461" data-end="1485"> FY24 → ₹127.36 crore </li> </ul> Profit After Tax <ul data-start="1510" data-end="1557"> <li data-start="1510" data-end="1533"> FY25 → ₹16.23 crore </li> <li data-start="1534" data-end="1557"> FY24 → ₹14.57 crore </li> </ul> The slowdown came mainly from lower EPC activity, not from any structural weakness. The bottom line is clear: The India business made a profit again this year. <h3 data-start="1728" data-end="1770">Brazil (discontinued operations)</h3> Loss before tax <ul data-start="1794" data-end="1818"> <li data-start="1794" data-end="1818"> FY25 → ₹409.94 crore </li> </ul> Loss after tax <ul data-start="1841" data-end="1865"> <li data-start="1841" data-end="1865"> FY25 → ₹452.16 crore </li> </ul> These losses alone are several times the profit India generated. <h3 data-start="1933" data-end="1964">Consolidated net loss</h3> <ul data-start="1965" data-end="1993"> <li data-start="1965" data-end="1993"> FY25 → ₹425.53 crore </li> </ul> It is Brazil—not India—that pushes the company into consolidated red ink. <hr data-start="2070" data-end="2073" /> <h2 data-start="2075" data-end="2105">Why the Losses Continue</h2> <h3 data-start="2107" data-end="2151">1. The Brazil business was abandoned</h3> The entire Brazil portfolio has been classified as discontinued, with a loss of ₹452.16 crore this year alone. <h3 data-start="2269" data-end="2312">2. Heavy impairments were necessary</h3> The Brazilian holding company had borrowed BRL 3.25 billion under restrictive covenants. Once those covenants were breached, lenders could demand repayment. A restructuring arrangement now proposes that: <ul data-start="2526" data-end="2639"> <li data-start="2526" data-end="2588"> All Brazilian assets and equity in seven project companies be transferred to the lender for BRL 1 </li> </ul> This means equity value = zero. So SGL 5 wrote off receivables and exposure worth ₹313.75 crore. <h3 data-start="2748" data-end="2803">3. Indian EBITDA dipped due to lower EPC volume</h3> The combination of these three elements explains why a profitable Indian business still reports a consolidated loss. <hr data-start="3016" data-end="3019" /> <h2 data-start="3021" data-end="3061">Why Brazil Turned Into a Disaster</h2> <ul data-start="3063" data-end="3249"> <li data-start="3063" data-end="3082"> Excess leverage </li> <li data-start="3083" data-end="3106"> Breach of covenants </li> <li data-start="3107" data-end="3142"> Lender-controlled restructuring </li> <li data-start="3143" data-end="3193"> Assets being surrendered for a symbolic amount </li> <li data-start="3194" data-end="3214"> Equity wiped out </li> <li data-start="3215" data-end="3249"> Hundreds of crores written off </li> </ul> It wasn’t one bad project — it was a full-scale value erosion. <hr data-start="3315" data-end="3318" /> <h2 data-start="3320" data-end="3385">The Resonia Piece: The JV Where Much of the Action Happens</h2> When GIC decided to bet on India’s power transmission story, it didn’t want exposure to everything inside Sterlite Power. The parent company has EPC operations, manufacturing units, international ventures, and even the troubled Brazil business. A sovereign wealth fund would never pump money into a diversified entity with legacy risks it cannot control. So instead of writing a cheque to Sterlite Power, GIC partnered with Sterlite to create a clean, ring-fenced platform — Resonia — that would hold only the transmission assets. This structure gives GIC something far more valuable than a minority stake in the parent: control and clarity. In Resonia, GIC owns 49% with board rights, veto rights, and transparent cash flow waterfalls. Every rupee goes directly into transmission SPVs, not into EPC working capital, overseas expansions, or parent-level liabilities. It creates a governance framework that global investors prefer — predictable assets, stable availability-based returns, and no surprises. The JV design also solves another practical problem: asset separation. If Sterlite Power mixed EPC operations and asset ownership inside one company, valuation would be messy and conflicts would arise. With Resonia, Sterlite can operate projects and sell stakes cleanly into the JV. For GIC, this becomes a scalable India transmission platform—one they can eventually monetise through an InvIT listing or a strategic sale without touching Sterlite’s other businesses. In short, Resonia exists because it gives both sides what they want: Sterlite retains operational control and a vehicle to monetise projects, while GIC gets a protected, transmission-only platform insulated from Brazil, EPC volatility, and parent-level risks. It’s structure over simplicity — by design. Resonia is a 51:49 joint platform between SGL 5 and GIC. Many transmission SPVs operate within this entity. Key interactions include: During this year, Sterlite Grid 5 has transferred 4 assets to Resonia Limited i.e. Sterlite Grid 13 Limited, Sterlite Grid 14 Limited, Sterlite Grid 18 Limited and Sterlite Grid 29 Limited <hr data-start="4155" data-end="4158" /> <h2 data-start="4160" data-end="4196">Industry Tailwinds Are Strong</h2> India’s transmission landscape is expanding rapidly: <ul data-start="4252" data-end="4510"> <li data-start="4252" data-end="4316"> Line length: 4.58 lakh ckm to 6.5 Lkah ckm by 2030 </li> <li data-start="4317" data-end="4382"> Renewable capacity: ~259 GW, targeting 500 GW by 2030 </li> <li data-start="4383" data-end="4437"> Transmission capex (2026-27): ₹1 lakh crore </li> <li data-start="4438" data-end="4510"> Competitive-bid awards rising: 45 projects in FY25 vs 23 in FY24 </li> </ul> Sterlite Grid 5 is well positioned with: <ul data-start="4554" data-end="4680"> <li data-start="4554" data-end="4584"> deep execution capability, </li> <li data-start="4585" data-end="4618"> major RE evacuation projects, </li> <li data-start="4619" data-end="4680"> and a significant share of the private transmission market. </li> </ul> <hr data-start="4682" data-end="4685" /> <h2 data-start="4687" data-end="4709">The Bottom Line</h2> Sterlite Grid 5 is running two parallel stories: <h3 data-start="4765" data-end="4791">The India story:</h3> Profitable operations, strong asset base, healthy sector outlook. <h3 data-start="4859" data-end="4886">The Brazil story:</h3> A failed international expansion that required a full clean-up and continues to distort consolidated results. As the Brazil exposure gets fully written off and removed from the balance sheet, the company’s numbers should start reflecting the underlying strength of the Indian business. The business model is intact. The foreign misadventure was not. If Sterlite continues disciplined capital allocation and effective monetisation through Resonia, the long-term outlook remains favourable.

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Blog6 Dec 2025

When Valuation Meets Reality: The Equity–Preference Puzzle at Hella Infra

On 30 June 2025, Hella Infra Market Limited (HIML) got itself a fresh valuation report for its Compulsorily Convertible Cumulative Preference Shares (CCPS). The report does two things: <ol data-start="636" data-end="827"> <li data-start="636" data-end="704"> It tells you how much the company is worth as of that date. </li> <li data-start="705" data-end="827"> It tells you how many shares were outstanding — both equity and preference </li> </ol> But that was only the beginning. Because what followed over the next few months created a classic equity vs preference mismatch that every investor must understand. <hr data-start="999" data-end="1002" /> <h1 data-start="1004" data-end="1061">A) First, the cap-table snapshot as on 30 June 2025</h1> From the valuation report; Equity Shares Outstanding (30 June 2025): 3,53,901 equity shares <h3 data-start="1243" data-end="1298">Preference Shares Outstanding (30 June 2025):</h3> Multiple preference series existed, all clubbed under CCPS, each with different investors. The value per CCPS determined by valuer = ₹2,13,408.70 per share. This price becomes important because all future CCPS issuances between July–Sept 2025 use the same valuation. <h1 data-start="158" data-end="217">Shareholding as on 30 June 2025 (Fully Diluted Basis)</h1> <div class="TyagGW_tableContainer"> <div class="group TyagGW_tableWrapper flex w-fit flex-col-reverse" tabindex="-1"> <table class="w-fit min-w-(--thread-content-width)" data-start="219" data-end="2463"> <thead data-start="219" data-end="309"> <tr data-start="219" data-end="309"> <th style="text-align: center;" data-start="219" data-end="245" data-col-size="md">Name of Shareholder</th> <th style="text-align: center;" data-start="245" data-end="287" data-col-size="sm">Total No. of Shares (Fully Diluted)</th> <th style="text-align: center;" data-start="287" data-end="309" data-col-size="sm">% Shareholding</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody data-start="404" data-end="2463"> <tr data-start="404" data-end="452"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="404" data-end="431" data-col-size="md">Souvik Pukakesh Sengupta</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="431" data-end="442">1,18,000</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="442" data-end="452">10.58%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="453" data-end="500"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="453" data-end="479" data-col-size="md">Aaditya Gajendra Sharda</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="479" data-end="490">1,17,800</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="490" data-end="500">10.56%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="501" data-end="545"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="501" data-end="527" data-col-size="md">Bizzaro Productions LLP</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="527" data-end="536">10,000</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="536" data-end="545">0.90%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="546" data-end="591"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="546" data-end="573" data-col-size="md">Bizzaro Advisory Limited</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="573" data-end="582">58,000</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="582" data-end="591">5.20%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="592" data-end="643"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="592" data-end="626" data-col-size="md">Silverline Home Private Limited</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="626" data-end="634">8,000</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="634" data-end="643">0.72%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="644" data-end="683"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="644" data-end="669" data-col-size="md">Nikhita Aaditya Sharda</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="669" data-end="674">50</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="674" data-end="683">0.00%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="684" data-end="722"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="684" data-end="708" data-col-size="md">Aarti Gajendra Sharda</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="708" data-end="713">50</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="713" data-end="722">0.00%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="723" data-end="753"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="723" data-end="739" data-col-size="md">Sunita Sharda</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="739" data-end="744">50</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="744" data-end="753">0.00%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="754" data-end="786"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="754" data-end="772" data-col-size="md">Gajendra Sharda</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="772" data-end="777">50</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="777" data-end="786">0.00%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="787" data-end="847"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="787" data-end="829" data-col-size="md">Employee Stock Options Available & Free</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="829" data-end="838">65,985</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="838" data-end="847">5.91%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="848" data-end="910"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="848" data-end="892" data-col-size="md">Employee Stock Options Granted and Vested</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="892" data-end="901">12,819</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="901" data-end="910">1.15%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="911" data-end="975"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="911" data-end="957" data-col-size="md">Employee Stock Options Granted and Unvested</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="957" data-end="966">21,362</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="966" data-end="975">1.91%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="976" data-end="1012"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="976" data-end="997" data-col-size="md">Shashank Danagachy</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="997" data-end="1003">950</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1003" data-end="1012">0.08%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1013" data-end="1045"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1013" data-end="1028" data-col-size="md">Vikram Reddy</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1028" data-end="1036">1,250</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1036" data-end="1045">0.11%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1046" data-end="1086"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1046" data-end="1071" data-col-size="md">Other equity investors</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1071" data-end="1077">300</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1077" data-end="1086">0.03%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1087" data-end="1119"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1087" data-end="1104" data-col-size="md">Dhruv Agarwala</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1104" data-end="1110">700</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1110" data-end="1119">0.06%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1120" data-end="1177"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1120" data-end="1156" data-col-size="md">Accel India V (Mauritius) Limited</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1156" data-end="1167">1,65,811</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1167" data-end="1177">14.86%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1178" data-end="1225"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1178" data-end="1204" data-col-size="md">Internet Fund V Pte Ltd</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1204" data-end="1215">2,19,559</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1215" data-end="1225">19.68%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1226" data-end="1267"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1226" data-end="1249" data-col-size="md">Nexus Ventures V LTD</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1249" data-end="1258">83,162</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1258" data-end="1267">7.45%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1268" data-end="1321"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1268" data-end="1303" data-col-size="md">Evolvence India Fund III Limited</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1303" data-end="1312">41,374</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1312" data-end="1321">3.71%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1322" data-end="1371"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1322" data-end="1353" data-col-size="md">Evolvence India Coinvest PCC</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1353" data-end="1362">15,550</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1362" data-end="1371">1.39%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1372" data-end="1420"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1372" data-end="1403" data-col-size="md">EIF IV Coinvest PCC (Cell A)</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1403" data-end="1411">7,871</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1411" data-end="1420">0.71%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1421" data-end="1467"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1421" data-end="1449" data-col-size="md">Sistema Asia Fund Pte Ltd</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1449" data-end="1458">19,705</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1458" data-end="1467">1.77%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1468" data-end="1520"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1468" data-end="1503" data-col-size="md">Sistema Asia Fund India Ventures</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1503" data-end="1511">1,606</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1511" data-end="1520">0.14%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1521" data-end="1568"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1521" data-end="1550" data-col-size="md">Foundamental GmbH & Co. KG</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1550" data-end="1559">14,763</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1559" data-end="1568">1.32%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1569" data-end="1623"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1569" data-end="1606" data-col-size="md">Foundamental CM Fund GmbH & Co. KG</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1606" data-end="1614">5,562</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1614" data-end="1623">0.50%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1624" data-end="1672"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1624" data-end="1655" data-col-size="md">Alteria Capital India Fund I</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1655" data-end="1663">1,225</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1663" data-end="1672">0.11%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1673" data-end="1731"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1673" data-end="1716" data-col-size="md">Alteria Capital India Fund II – Scheme I</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1716" data-end="1722">331</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1722" data-end="1731">0.03%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1732" data-end="1791"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1732" data-end="1776" data-col-size="md">Alteria Capital India Fund III – Scheme A</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1776" data-end="1782">459</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1782" data-end="1791">0.04%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1792" data-end="1846"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1792" data-end="1829" data-col-size="md">Stride Venture India Debt Fund – 1</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1829" data-end="1837">6,175</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1837" data-end="1846">0.55%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1847" data-end="1904"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1847" data-end="1887" data-col-size="md">InnoVen Capital India Private Limited</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1887" data-end="1895">1,000</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1895" data-end="1904">0.09%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1905" data-end="1951"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1905" data-end="1934" data-col-size="md">InnoVen Capital India Fund</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1934" data-end="1942">3,000</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1942" data-end="1951">0.27%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1952" data-end="2001"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="1952" data-end="1984" data-col-size="md">Trifecta Venture Debt Fund II</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1984" data-end="1992">5,886</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1992" data-end="2001">0.53%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2002" data-end="2049"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="2002" data-end="2032" data-col-size="md">Stride Venture Debt Fund II</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2032" data-end="2040">2,906</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2040" data-end="2049">0.26%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2050" data-end="2098"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="2050" data-end="2083" data-col-size="md">Trifecta Venture Debt Fund III</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2083" data-end="2089">998</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2089" data-end="2098">0.09%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2099" data-end="2138"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="2099" data-end="2121" data-col-size="md">Series E1 Investors</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2121" data-end="2129">2,100</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2129" data-end="2138">0.19%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2139" data-end="2178"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="2139" data-end="2161" data-col-size="md">Series E2 Investors</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2161" data-end="2169">5,062</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2169" data-end="2178">0.45%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2179" data-end="2218"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="2179" data-end="2201" data-col-size="md">Series E3 Investors</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2201" data-end="2209">1,261</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2209" data-end="2218">0.11%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2219" data-end="2259"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="2219" data-end="2241" data-col-size="md">Series E4 Investors</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2241" data-end="2250">49,130</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2250" data-end="2259">4.40%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2260" data-end="2300"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="2260" data-end="2282" data-col-size="md">Series E5 Investors</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2282" data-end="2291">26,021</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2291" data-end="2300">2.33%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2301" data-end="2340"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="2301" data-end="2323" data-col-size="md">Series E6 Investors</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2323" data-end="2331">7,098</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2331" data-end="2340">0.63%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2341" data-end="2378"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="2341" data-end="2363" data-col-size="md">Series E7 Investors</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2363" data-end="2369">514</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2369" data-end="2378">0.05%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2379" data-end="2419"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="2379" data-end="2401" data-col-size="md">Series F1 Investors</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2401" data-end="2410">17,733</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2410" data-end="2419">1.59%</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2420" data-end="2463"> <td style="text-align: center;" data-start="2420" data-end="2432" data-col-size="md">Total</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2432" data-end="2448">11,15,834</td> <td style="text-align: center;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2448" data-end="2463">100.00%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> </div> <hr data-start="1580" data-end="1583" /> <h1 data-start="1585" data-end="1653">B) After the valuation date… new preference shares were issued</h1> Between 30 June 2025 and 23 September 2025, the company issued several rounds of CCPS, all at the same valuation: ₹2,13,408.70 per CCPS <h3 data-start="1810" data-end="1858">Detailed CCPS issuance post 30 June 2025</h3> <div class="TyagGW_tableContainer"> <div class="group TyagGW_tableWrapper flex w-fit flex-col-reverse" tabindex="-1"> <table class="w-fit min-w-(--thread-content-width)" style="width: 41.2916%;" data-start="1860" data-end="2296"> <thead data-start="1860" data-end="1894"> <tr data-start="1860" data-end="1894"> <th style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-start="1860" data-end="1867" data-col-size="sm">Date</th> <th style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-start="1867" data-end="1881" data-col-size="sm">CCPS Issued</th> <th style="text-align: center; width: 28.3519%;" data-start="1881" data-end="1894" data-col-size="sm">Price (₹)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody data-start="1930" data-end="2296"> <tr data-start="1930" data-end="1969"> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-start="1930" data-end="1949" data-col-size="sm">30 June 2025</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1949" data-end="1955">915</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 28.3519%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1955" data-end="1969">2,13,408.7</td> </tr> <tr data-start="1970" data-end="2008"> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-start="1970" data-end="1989" data-col-size="sm">18 July 2025</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1989" data-end="1994">45</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 28.3519%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="1994" data-end="2008">2,13,408.7</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2009" data-end="2048"> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-start="2009" data-end="2028" data-col-size="sm">24 July 2025</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2028" data-end="2034">253</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 28.3519%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2034" data-end="2048">2,13,408.7</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2049" data-end="2086"> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-start="2049" data-end="2066" data-col-size="sm">5 Aug 2025</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2066" data-end="2072">930</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 28.3519%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2072" data-end="2086">2,13,408.7</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2087" data-end="2127"> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-start="2087" data-end="2105" data-col-size="sm">30 Aug 2025</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2105" data-end="2113">1,709</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 28.3519%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2113" data-end="2127">2,13,408.7</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2128" data-end="2169"> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-start="2128" data-end="2147" data-col-size="sm">19 Sept 2025</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2147" data-end="2155">8,246</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 28.3519%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2155" data-end="2169">2,13,408.7</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2170" data-end="2211"> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-start="2170" data-end="2189" data-col-size="sm">20 Sept 2025</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2189" data-end="2197">2,061</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 28.3519%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2197" data-end="2211">2,13,408.7</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2212" data-end="2254"> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-start="2212" data-end="2231" data-col-size="sm">22 Sept 2025</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2231" data-end="2240">10,195</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 28.3519%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2240" data-end="2254">2,13,408.7</td> </tr> <tr data-start="2255" data-end="2296"> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-start="2255" data-end="2274" data-col-size="sm">23 Sept 2025</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 35.9124%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2274" data-end="2282">2,061</td> <td style="text-align: center; width: 28.3519%;" data-col-size="sm" data-start="2282" data-end="2296">2,13,408.7</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> </div> And later… <h3 data-start="2310" data-end="2347">14 Nov 2025 – Shilpa Shetty</h3> 89 CCPS issued, again at ₹2,13,408.70. This means substantial capital was infused into the company after the valuation date. <hr data-start="2489" data-end="2492" /> <h1 data-start="2494" data-end="2546">C) Then came the twist — A Massive Bonus Issue</h1> The company allotted 2,83,120,800 bonus equity shares in the ratio 800:1. <h3 data-start="2631" data-end="2659">Pre-bonus equity count</h3> 3,53,901 shares <h3 data-start="2681" data-end="2710">Post-bonus equity count</h3> 3,53,901 × 800 = 2,83,120,800 (bonus) Total = 2,83,474,701 (approx) This means equity shareholders saw their count explode ~800×. But… <hr data-start="2860" data-end="2863" /> <h1 data-start="2865" data-end="2945">D) Preference shares did NOT convert. Conversion happens only after UDRHP.</h1> This is the most important part of the story: <ul data-start="2994" data-end="3224"> <li data-start="2994" data-end="3045"> The company filed only a Confidential DRHP. </li> <li data-start="3046" data-end="3224"> Conversion of CCPS into equity happens only when the UDRHP (public DRHP) is filed. </li> </ul> <h3 data-start="3226" data-end="3238">Meaning?</h3> 👉 Preference shares are still preference shares. 👉 They have NOT been converted into equity. 👉 They did NOT receive bonus shares. So after all the bonus issuance: <h3 data-start="3424" data-end="3455">Equity increased 800×</h3> <h3 data-start="3456" data-end="3499">Preference shares remained the same</h3> This creates a temporary valuation distortion in the unlisted market. <hr data-start="3576" data-end="3579" /> <h1 data-start="3581" data-end="3619">E) Why investors must be careful</h1> Many investors look only at: <ul data-start="3651" data-end="3725"> <li data-start="3651" data-end="3673"> Latest share price </li> <li data-start="3674" data-end="3694"> Latest valuation </li> <li data-start="3695" data-end="3725"> Total shares after bonus </li> </ul> But here’s the catch… <h3 data-start="3750" data-end="3804">The valuation on 30 June 2025 was done BEFORE:</h3> <ul data-start="3805" data-end="3879"> <li data-start="3805" data-end="3831"> Massive CCPS issuances </li> <li data-start="3832" data-end="3847"> Bonus issue </li> <li data-start="3848" data-end="3879"> Any CCPS-to-equity conversion </li> </ul> So if someone sees "bonus-adjusted equity shares" and compares it with "valuation as of 30 June", they will get a wrong valuation per share. <h3 data-start="4027" data-end="4090">And this is exactly where retail investors get trapped.</h3> <hr data-start="4092" data-end="4095" /> <h1 data-start="4097" data-end="4133">The UnlistedZone-takeaway</h1> <h3 data-start="4135" data-end="4193">1. The bonus was given only to equity shareholders.</h3> <h3 data-start="4194" data-end="4265">2. The preference shares will convert only after UDRHP is filed.</h3> <h3 data-start="4266" data-end="4373">3. Until then, the structure is skewed — and investors must know which class of shares they’re buying.</h3> If you buy equity today, you’re buying in a post-bonus world. If you buy preference shares today, you’re buying a pre-conversion instrument, issued at ₹2.13 lakh per share, which will convert later at a fixed formula. The two cannot be compared directly. <hr data-start="4641" data-end="4644" /> <h1 data-start="4646" data-end="4668">Final Thought</h1> Understand the class of shares, understand the timing, and never mix valuation dates with bonus events. Because in unlisted markets, the devil is always in the cap table. The expected valuation of the IPO is around 3-3.5 Billion dollar.

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Blog5 Dec 2025

IFC Pumps ~$50 Million Investment to Power India's Into GFCL EV

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Blog4 Dec 2025

Furlenco’s Second Innings: Profitability, Fresh Funding, and an IPO on the Horizon

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Blog4 Dec 2025

Nayara Energy’s Export Boom: Dodging Sanctions with Russian Crude

India’s oil scene just recorded a surprising twist — and Nayara Energy is at the centre of it. After months of pressure from EU sanctions, the Rosneft-backed refiner has suddenly doubled its fuel exports in November. From 75,000 barrels per day in October to 150,000 barrels per day (bpd) in November — its highest level since March. So, what changed? <h3>A) How Did the Sanctions Change the Game?</h3> Back in July, the European Union slapped sanctions on Nayara. While the US hasn’t targeted the refiner directly, Rosneft — Nayara’s main shareholder — has been sanctioned, adding indirect pressure. The impact was immediate: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Difficulty sourcing crude oil </li> <li> Disrupted export channels </li> <li> Shipping partners backing out to avoid regulatory trouble </li> </ul> But disruption also forced innovation. <h3>B) Russia Becomes the Lifeline</h3> Nayara now sources 100% of its crude from Russia. In November alone, it imported 408,000 bpd, the highest since May. And because Russian crude is available at a steep discount due to global sanctions, Nayara has found itself operating very close to its maximum profitable capacity. Cheaper crude → lower refining cost → higher margins → more exports. <h3>C) New Buyers, New Routes, New Strategy</h3> With old markets becoming harder to access, Nayara has expanded into new destinations: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Bahamas </li> <li> Taiwan </li> <li> Sudan </li> <li> Brazil </li> <li> Turkey </li> </ul> Interestingly, almost one-third of Nayara’s exports didn’t go directly to a final customer. Instead, they traveled through ship-to-ship (STS) hubs like Fujairah (UAE) and Sohar (Oman) — both known for helping obscure the final destination of sensitive oil cargoes. This isn’t unheard of. Iran and Russia routinely use the same tactic to avoid sanction-linked scrutiny. <h3>D) Why the Sudden Export Sprint?</h3> A mix of factors worked in Nayara’s favour: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Refining capacity back near optimal levels </li> <li> Discounted Russian crude supply </li> <li> Shrinking Russian refined exports (after Ukrainian drone attacks) </li> <li> New buyers willing to deal despite sanctions </li> <li> Flexible logistics networks using STS and transshipment hubs </li> </ul> In short, the company is capitalizing on a reshuffled global oil market where traditional trade lines have blurred. <h3>The Bigger Picture</h3> This export surge signals something larger: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> India is emerging as a key refining hub in a post-sanctions world. </li> <li> Refiners like Nayara benefit from buying cheap Russian crude and selling refined fuel at global prices. </li> <li> Countries avoiding direct purchase from Russia find Indian fuel a convenient workaround. </li> </ul> In other words, India is becoming the middleman in global energy rerouting. <h3>E) So What Happens Next?</h3> If geopolitical conditions remain unchanged, Nayara’s model could continue thriving: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> High import volumes </li> <li> Flexible export routing </li> <li> Expansion into sanction-neutral markets </li> </ul> But the risk remains: <ul data-spread="false"> <li> Any future secondary sanctions </li> <li> Increased scrutiny of ship-to-ship transfers </li> <li> Volatility in Russian crude availability </li> </ul> For now, though, Nayara has found its rhythm — and it’s exporting at full volume. <h3>The Takeaway</h3> A few months ago, sanctions threatened to cripple Nayara Energy. Today, with discounted Russian supply and creative trade logistics, the company is not just surviving — it’s scaling up. The oil market may be global, but right now, Nayara’s playbook is hyper-local, opportunistic, and working.

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Blog2 Dec 2025

Delta Galaxy Engineering Services Limited – FY 2024–25 Financial Analysis

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