There's a cybersecurity company in Mumbai that most people haven't heard of, and yet its shares are being quoted in India's unlisted market at a valuation of roughly ₹2,500 crore.
It's called 63SATS Cybertech. It's 65.27% owned by 63 moons technologies — Jignesh Shah's company, the one that used to be Financial Technologies India.
And its FY26 numbers look, on the face of it, spectacular.
Revenue went from ₹2.4 crore to ₹87.2 crore. That's a 36x jump in twelve months. Losses shrank from ₹16.1 crore to ₹5 crore. The company raised ₹255.67 crore from investors. It now sits on ₹204 crore of cash with essentially zero debt.
Cybersecurity is a hot theme. India's DPDP Act is creating compliance demand. There are barely any pure-play listed cybersecurity companies in India. So retail investors have been buying 63SATS in the grey market.
But here's the thing that makes this report worth reading carefully.
The company itself sold shares at ₹10 in September and October 2025.
The unlisted market is now quoting it around ₹24 to ₹28.
Same company. Same financial year. Roughly 2.5 times the price, about ten months later.
Let's work out what changed.
The annual report describes an ambitious business. Three product lines:
CYBX — described as the world's first B2C cybersecurity super app, built for everyone "from students and farmers to professionals and small business owners."
CSF (Cyber Security Force) — an enterprise-grade framework for organisations of all sizes.
CYBERDOME — a defence-grade framework offering "military-level protection" for critical infrastructure, state governments and smart cities.
Plus services: risk assessments, penetration testing, incident response, DPDP compliance advisory, OT security, cloud security posture management.
It's a genuinely exciting pitch. Now here's the revenue table from Note 22:
Revenue from operations | ₹ lakh | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Sale of softwares and IT products | 8,417.89 | 96.6% |
| Security services & support charges | 283.07 | 3.2% |
| Franchisee fees | 15.18 | 0.2% |
| Total | 8,716.13 |
And the corresponding cost line, from Note 24, is labelled: "Total Purchase of Traded goods — ₹4,007.74 lakh."
Read those two together and the picture changes.
Ninety-seven percent of revenue comes from selling software and IT products, and nearly half of that revenue is offset by the cost of buying those products in. This is, today, largely a reselling business. Buy third-party software, sell it on, keep the spread.
The proprietary products — CYBX, CSF, CYBERDOME — are real and are being built. They just aren't yet where the money comes from. Services, which is where a security company's own expertise shows up in the P&L, contributed ₹2.83 crore. That's 3.2%.
One more line worth noting: the geographic split shows ₹8,716.13 lakh from India and nil from everywhere else. The global cybersecurity ambition is real as ambition. The business today is entirely domestic.
This is the part of the report that repays attention.
Total expenses were ₹101.5 crore against revenue of ₹87.2 crore. Here's the shape of it:
Head | ₹ crore | % of revenue |
|---|---|---|
| Cost of goods sold | 40.1 | 46% |
| Other expenses | 39.7 | 46% |
| Employee benefits | 19.3 | 22% |
| Finance costs + depreciation | 2.5 | 3% |
Notice something odd. "Other expenses" is more than double the employee cost.
For a software company, that's backwards. People are supposed to be the biggest line. So what's inside it?
Item | FY26 (₹ lakh) | FY25 (₹ lakh) |
|---|---|---|
| Advertisement, branding & event sponsorship | 1,320.44 | 37.88 |
| Sales promotion expenses | 1,509.90 | 244.78 |
| Legal and professional charges | 301.03 | 42.48 |
| Software license fees | 228.47 | 85.41 |
| Commission on sales | 151.32 | 37.01 |
| Travelling and conveyance | 115.30 | 72.31 |
| Remuneration to Non-Executive Directors | 82.90 | 16.25 |
Advertising and branding went up 35 times. Sales promotion went up 6 times.
Add the top two lines together and you get ₹28.3 crore on marketing — which is 32.5% of revenue.
Now hold that number next to another one buried in the Directors' Report:
Expenditure incurred on Research and Development: ₹243.03 lakh
That's ₹2.43 crore. On R&D. For the year.
Marketing ₹28.3 crore. R&D ₹2.4 crore. A ratio of about 11.6 to 1.
A company that describes itself as "an IP-led organisation" investing in "indigenous ideas" spent roughly eleven times more telling people about its products than building them.
To be fair, there's a defensible reading. A B2C security app genuinely needs brand awareness — nobody downloads a security app they've never heard of. Building distribution before building depth is a real strategy, and plenty of consumer companies have run it successfully.
But it does change what you're buying. At these ratios, this year's spending was a customer acquisition bet, not a technology bet.
One more detail from the employee line. Total employee cost was ₹19.3 crore. Of that, ₹3.98 crore went to the three executive directors — a little over a fifth of the entire payroll.
Reported loss before tax: ₹6.36 crore. After a deferred tax credit of ₹1.33 crore, the reported net loss is ₹5.03 crore.
But look at Note 23 — other income of ₹7.99 crore:
Other income | ₹ lakh |
|---|---|
| Gain on fair valuation of financial assets | 512.31 |
| Interest received on inter-corporate deposits | 149.86 |
| Interest on bank deposits | 135.05 |
| Interest on income tax refunds | 1.43 |
| Miscellaneous | 0.14 |
| Total | 798.79 |
None of this is cybersecurity. It's treasury income — the return on parking the ₹255 crore that investors put in.
Strip it out and the arithmetic is straightforward:
₹ lakh | |
|---|---|
| Reported loss before tax | (635.73) |
| Remove other income | (798.79) |
| Operating loss | (1,434.52) |
The business lost about ₹14.3 crore, not ₹6.4 crore. The gap was filled by mutual fund gains and interest.
That's not a criticism of the accounting — the presentation is standard and the auditors, CVB & Associates, issued a clean unmodified opinion. It just means the headline "losses narrowed sharply" needs an asterisk. Losses narrowed partly because the company had a lot of idle cash earning returns.
Here's the balance sheet, simplified.
Total assets: ₹311 crore. Now look at what's in there:
₹ crore | |
|---|---|
| Investments (mutual funds) | 86.9 |
| Bank balances other than cash | 44.4 |
| Loans (inter-corporate deposits) | 40.0 |
| Cash and cash equivalents | 33.3 |
| Total liquid | 204.6 |
Total equity is ₹297.5 crore. So roughly 69% of the company's net worth is cash, mutual funds and money lent out.
The auditors' CARO report confirms it plainly: the unutilised amount from the fundraise has been kept in short term mutual funds, inter-corporate deposits and cash.
That's not unusual for a company that has just raised money and hasn't deployed it yet. But it matters for valuation, because you're valuing an operating business plus a large pile of cash, and the two deserve very different multiples.
Two items in there deserve a second look.
Inter-corporate deposits. The company granted ₹55 crore of ICDs during the year, with ₹40 crore outstanding at year end. The auditors specifically noted that ICDs of ₹25 crore which had fallen due for repayment were extended for a further six months. It's a disclosure, not a qualification. But a cybersecurity company lending out ₹40 crore, with a quarter of it rolled over past its due date, is worth understanding.
Trade receivables of ₹58.2 crore — against annual revenue of ₹87.2 crore. The company's own ratio disclosure shows trade receivables turnover collapsing from 10.88 to 2.97, with the explanation that receivables were high at year end but not yet due for payment. That's plausible if revenue was heavily back-loaded. FY27 will show whether the cash actually arrives.
Here's where the report gives you something the grey market doesn't: an actual, documented price at which sophisticated buyers valued this company.
What the company itself sold shares for during FY26:
Date | Shares issued | Price | Allottees |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5 May 2025 | 10.62 crore | ₹1 (at par) | 14 |
| 9 September 2025 | 18.00 crore | ₹10 | 27 |
| 10 October 2025 | 6.51 crore | ₹10 | 5 |
Total raised: ₹255.67 crore. Separately, 60 crore shares were issued on conversion of zero-coupon debentures.
Share count at 31 March 2026: 1,01,12,49,700 shares of ₹1 each. That's 101.12 crore shares.
So in September and October 2025, thirty-two preferential allottees — people who do diligence and negotiate — paid ₹10 a share. At that price:
101.12 crore shares × ₹10 = ₹1,011 crore
What the unlisted market quotes now: roughly ₹24 to ₹28 per share.
Run the multiples:
Price | Market cap | P/Sales | P/Book |
|---|---|---|---|
| ₹10 (company's own issue price) | ₹1,011 cr | 11.6x | 3.4x |
| ₹24 | ₹2,427 cr | 27.8x | 8.2x |
| ₹28 | ₹2,831 cr | 32.5x | 9.5x |
And the number that anchors all of this: book value per share is ₹2.94. (₹297.5 crore of equity ÷ 101.12 crore shares.)
At ₹25, you'd be paying about 8.5 times book for a company that made an operating loss, where 69% of that book value is sitting in mutual funds.
Three things stand out.
The company sold at ₹10 ten months ago. FY26's entire performance — the ₹87 crore revenue, the 36x growth, all of it — was already unfolding when those allottees paid ₹10 in September and October 2025. The grey market is now asking roughly 2.5 times that. Something has to have changed to justify it, and the annual report is the place you'd expect to find it.
Twenty-nine times sales is a software-company multiple. Global cybersecurity leaders trade around 20x sales — but with 75%-plus gross margins, revenue in billions of dollars, and their own products. 63SATS has 54% gross margins, ₹87 crore of revenue, 96.6% of it from reselling, and an operating loss. Valued as what it is today — an IT reselling and services business — comparable multiples are in the low single digits. The 29x is pricing what it might become.
The base year was almost zero. FY25 revenue was ₹2.4 crore. Growing 36x from a base that small is a real achievement, but it's also arithmetic. One year of data doesn't establish that ₹87 crore repeats, let alone compounds.
It would be lazy to leave it there, because several things about this company are genuinely strong.
The balance sheet is clean. Debt-to-equity is 0.00. Current ratio is 29.73. With ₹204 crore liquid and an operating loss of ₹14 crore, this company has many years of runway. It is not going to be forced into a bad raise.
Losses did narrow sharply — from ₹16.1 crore to ₹5 crore — while revenue went up 36x. Even on the operating-only number, the company scaled revenue far faster than it scaled losses.
Gross margin of 54% is decent for a business doing this much reselling, and it gives the company something to build on as the mix shifts.
The theme is real, not manufactured. The DPDP Act is creating genuine compliance demand. Cyber threats are growing. India has very few listed pure-play cybersecurity companies, so some scarcity premium is legitimate rather than irrational.
The parent matters. 63 moons brings capital, enterprise relationships and technology heritage. The company also approved an ESOP scheme in May 2026 — 12 crore options — which it will need to attract security talent. (Worth noting that's roughly 12% dilution on the current base.)
And this is a 20-year-old company, not a startup — the Directors' Report is the 20th. The cybersecurity business is new, but the corporate vehicle isn't.
Two things are true at once, and both belong in the same sentence.
63SATS has built a ₹87 crore revenue business from almost nothing in a year, has ₹204 crore in the bank, no debt, and sits in a sector with real tailwinds. That's a legitimate story worth watching.
And the unlisted market is currently pricing it at roughly 29 times sales and 8.5 times book — about 2.5 times the price at which the company itself sold shares to institutional allottees ten months ago — for a business that is, today, mostly a software reseller running an operating loss, spending eleven rupees on marketing for every rupee on R&D.
Neither of those cancels the other out. The question isn't whether 63SATS is a good company. It's whether the price already assumes the transformation has happened.
Three things to check in the FY27 report:
Does the revenue mix shift? "Sale of softwares and IT products" needs to fall from 96.6%, and "Security services" needs to rise from 3.2%. That single line is the difference between a reseller and a product company, and it's the entire valuation argument.
Do the receivables convert? ₹58.2 crore is sitting there. If it collects cleanly, FY26's revenue was real. If it doesn't, questions follow.
Does the ₹28 crore of marketing produce anything? That was the year's biggest discretionary bet. FY27 revenue growth is the scorecard.
And one structural point that's easy to miss. 63SATS is unlisted, so it doesn't publish quarterly results. The next real data point arrives with the FY27 annual report, roughly a year from now. Meanwhile the grey market price moves every day.
Price updates daily. Information updates annually. That mismatch is a risk in itself, regardless of what you think of the company.
All figures are taken from the 63SATS Cybertech Limited Annual Report FY 2025-26 (standalone financial statements, audited by CVB & Associates, Chartered Accountants, who issued an unmodified opinion). Unlisted market prices are indicative quotes from unlisted-share platforms as of August 2026 and are not firm or exchange-verified; price discovery in the unlisted market is opaque and quotes vary between platforms.
Figures derived by arithmetic on the report's own numbers rather than printed directly: the marketing-to-R&D ratio, the operating loss excluding other income, book value per share, and all market cap and valuation multiples. Every input is disclosed in the report.
Key notes referenced: Note 15 (share capital and shareholding), Note 22 (revenue and geographic split), Note 23 (other income), Note 24–28 (expenses), Note 32 (ratio analysis), Note 33 (related party disclosure), and the CARO annexure to the auditors' report. Share allotment details and R&D expenditure are from the Directors' Report.
This is an explainer, not investment advice. Unlisted shares carry liquidity risk — exiting a position is not straightforward and there is no exchange-mediated price.