Renfra Energy India Limited
The company that builds a solar plant in 100 days and has 465 MW of grid already booked
Renfra builds solar and wind plants for factories in Tamil Nadu that want cheaper power than the grid sells. Revenue doubled to ₹1,014 crore in FY26, profit rose to ₹157 crore, return on equity was 44% — and at ₹122 in the unlisted market it trades at 13 times earnings, in line with its listed peers. Here is the business, the numbers, and what you are paying for.
00Start here
Six parts. First the business, because "renewable EPC" hides more than it explains. Then the industry, briefly. Then three years of accounts, including the cash flow statement that the P&L doesn't show you. Then the two men who own 82% of the company. Then what ₹122 a share buys you in the unlisted market. Then the risks, the triggers, and a view.
Everything here comes from the Draft Red Herring Prospectus dated June 30, 2026, unless said otherwise. The DRHP reports in ₹ million; this note converts to crore (₹10 million = ₹1 crore). Fiscal years end March 31.
Part one · The business
01What they actually do
A textile mill in Coimbatore pays TANGEDCO around ₹7.50 a unit for power. If it owned a 5 MW solar plant a hundred kilometres away and wheeled that electricity through the state grid to its own factory, its effective cost would be a fraction of that. But the mill doesn't know how to find land, get a load-flow study approved, build a pooling substation, buy modules, or run the plant afterwards.
That is the whole of Renfra's business. It does all of those things, hands the mill a working plant, and then charges it a small annual fee to keep the plant running. The company calls this "Turnkey Solutions." It is EPC — engineering, procurement, construction — plus the two things most EPC contractors don't do: the land and the grid paperwork before, and the maintenance after.
The sequence matters. Renfra applies for grid connectivity first, buys land near the substation second, and finds a customer third. It is holding inventory of half-developed sites when it goes to sell. That is unusual, capital-hungry, and — as we'll see in Part three — the reason the balance sheet looks the way it does.
| Stream | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 | FY26 share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Solar turnkey projects | 439.9 | 408.2 | 646.7 | 63.8% |
| Wind turnkey projects | — | 85.7 | 350.4 | 34.6% |
| Operations & maintenance | 5.5 | 8.4 | 9.7 | 1.0% |
| Sale of land | 1.3 | 8.5 | 6.9 | 0.7% |
| Revenue from operations | 446.7 | 510.7 | 1,013.7 | 100% |
Two things to notice. O&M is tiny — under 1% of revenue — despite the company managing 601 MW of assets. The "annuity" part of the story is real but small. And solar revenue actually fell in FY25 before doubling in FY26; the DRHP attributes ₹116 crore of deferred recognition to heavy rain at the Kombukaranatham site in March 2025.
02Solar first, then wind
Renfra was incorporated in 2017 and spent its first years erecting and commissioning a 70 MW solar plant for someone else. In 2020 it started developing its own turnkey projects. Wind arrived only in FY25 — and went from nothing to a third of revenue in two years.
Wind projects are bigger tickets. The 17 ongoing wind projects average ₹27 crore each for 3.3 MW; the 20 ongoing solar projects average ₹21 crore for 4.2 MW. Wind also carries a longer build (150–180 days versus 100–110 for solar) and heavier inventory — turbine nacelles and blades sit on the books until commissioning. That explains a good part of why inventory went from ₹26 crore to ₹212 crore in FY26.
| Segment | Projects | MW | Order value | Billed to date | Remaining |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Solar | 20 | 83.0 | 424.6 | 236.5 | 188.0 |
| Wind | 17 | 56.1 | 457.4 | 128.4 | 329.0 |
| Total | 37 | 139.1 | 882.0 | 364.9 | 517.0 |
Every ongoing project is contracted to complete between June and December 2026. The ₹517 crore of unbilled work is about half of FY26 revenue — a thin cushion for a company that just doubled. The pipeline beyond it is the 465.5 MW of grid connectivity Renfra already holds (see 04), not signed contracts.
03Who buys, and why
The customers are commercial and industrial (C&I) power users in Tamil Nadu and Puducherry — 164 of them since inception, across 217 agreements. In FY26, commercial customers were 63% of revenue and industrial 35%. The DRHP does not disclose customer concentration, which is itself worth noting; it does disclose that 278 MW of the 601 MW ever ordered came from repeat customers.
Why they buy is simple arithmetic. Tamil Nadu's commercial tariff rose from ₹8.80 to ₹9.40 a unit between FY24 and FY26; industrial went from ₹7.00 to ₹7.50. Module prices, meanwhile, collapsed. A factory that builds a captive plant and wheels the power under Tamil Nadu's open-access rules locks in a cost well below the grid for 25 years. Renfra is selling a payback calculation, and the calculation has been getting better every year.
The flip side: this demand is entirely a creature of state regulation. Open-access charges, banking rules, cross-subsidy surcharges, and wheeling tariffs are set by the state regulator. Change them and the payback changes. Every Renfra project is connected to the state transmission utility; none to the central grid.
04The substation edge
If there is a moat, this is it. Grid connectivity in Tamil Nadu is applied for through TANGEDCO and Tamil Nadu Green Energy Corporation, requires a load-flow study, and is granted substation by substation depending on evacuation headroom. Renfra's claim is that it knows the substation network well enough to file the right application at the right substation, and that it files early — before it has a customer.
Alongside that sits a land bank of 640 acres for solar and 277 acres for wind, some of it aggregated by Speed Boomi Promoters LLP, a promoter-group entity. The connectivity and the land together are what let the company promise a 5 MW solar plant in 100 days: the slow parts are already done when the contract is signed.
Two subsidiaries extend this. Speed Mecotronix, bought in February 2026 for ₹10.2 crore, is building a module-mounting-structure factory (2,000 tonnes a month, due December 2026). Derrick Lifters owns cranes for wind-turbine erection. Both are attempts to pull cost and scheduling risk in-house. Both are new, and the MMS plant in particular is a manufacturing venture run by a company that has never manufactured anything.
Part two · The industry
05The 500 GW target
India's renewable capacity went from 78 GW in FY19 to 223 GW in FY26 — solar from 36 GW to 150 GW, wind to 56 GW. The government target is 500 GW of non-fossil capacity by 2030. CRISIL, whose report Renfra commissioned for the DRHP, estimates ₹12–13 trillion of solar investment over FY27–31. Nobody seriously disputes the direction. The question for an EPC contractor is not whether the capacity gets built but who builds it and at what margin.
Tamil Nadu specifically: 13.6 GW of ground-mounted solar in FY26, up from 3.8 GW in FY20, and 12.1 GW of wind — the state is one of three (with Gujarat and Karnataka) that accounted for 80% of India's wind additions from FY21 to FY26. It also has the country's highest C&I tariffs among southern states, which is the demand engine described in 03.
One quirk worth knowing: Tamil Nadu gets the north-east monsoon in October–December, not the south-west monsoon in July–September like the rest of India. Execution is heaviest in Q2 and Q4, and Q3 is often lost. Renfra's own FY25 revenue deferral came from March rain, outside even that window. Quarterly numbers for this company will be lumpy.
06Why factories build plants
Utility-scale solar — the 500 MW parks in Rajasthan — is a tender business won on price by large developers with their own EPC teams. C&I captive solar is different: hundreds of 2–10 MW projects for customers who care about payback, not tariff bids, and who need someone to handle the regulatory process. It is fragmented, regional, and relationship-driven. CRISIL puts C&I demand in Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, where industrial tariffs are highest.
The industry's stated threats are the ones you'd expect: large developers taking EPC in-house, infrastructure majors entering, module price swings (the ALMM domestic-content rules have already raised module costs versus imports), and regulatory changes to open access. Renfra's answer to the first two is that a national player does not know the Tirunelveli substation map. That is true, and it is also a ceiling: the same knowledge does not travel to Karnataka.
07The competition
The DRHP benchmarks against four listed and two unlisted peers. None is a clean comparable — every one of them owns generating assets (IPP) or makes modules, and Renfra does neither. It is the only pure contractor in the set, which cuts both ways: higher return on capital, no annuity.
| Company | Revenue | Rev. CAGR FY23–26 | Gross margin | PAT margin | ROE | Receivable days |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Renfra Energy | 1,013.7 | 54.4% | 35.2% | 15.5% | 43.6% | 81 |
| KPI Green Energy | 2,695.9 | 61.2% | 47.6% | 18.9% | 17.3% | 89 |
| K.P. Energy | 1,497.1 | 50.7% | 31.0% | 12.1% | 43.4% | 27 |
| Solarworld Energy | 1,376.2 | 80.9% | 14.1% | 8.8% | 20.9% | 65 |
| Zodiac Energy | 543.5 | 58.1% | 15.2% | 3.9% | 19.5% | 57 |
Source: CRISIL peer benchmarking in the DRHP. Renfra's receivable days here use average receivables; on year-end receivables the figure is 124 days (see 10). Prozeal Green and Deon Energy are unlisted and had no FY26 data.
Renfra's margins sit near the top of the set, its growth in the middle, and its ROE at the top with K.P. Energy. The one column where it looks worse than everyone but KPI Green is receivable days, and that is the column this note keeps coming back to.
Part three · The numbers
08Profit and loss
| FY24 | FY25 | FY26 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from operations | 446.7 | 510.7 | 1,013.7 |
| Other income | 0.0 | 0.7 | 4.5 |
| Total income | 446.7 | 511.4 | 1,018.2 |
| Purchases of stock-in-trade | 283.3 | 237.0 | 585.1 |
| Direct project expenses | 86.8 | 122.1 | 255.0 |
| Change in inventories | 0.2 | (24.4) | (183.0) |
| Employee benefit expense | 9.6 | 23.8 | 52.6 |
| Other expenses | 11.3 | 20.2 | 54.2 |
| EBITDA | 55.4 | 131.1 | 245.9 |
| EBITDA margin | 12.4% | 25.7% | 24.3% |
| Depreciation | 1.1 | 2.1 | 9.2 |
| Finance costs | 5.0 | 4.1 | 34.0 |
| Profit before tax | 49.5 | 126.6 | 211.0 |
| Tax | 12.6 | 32.1 | 54.2 |
| Profit after tax | 36.9 | 94.5 | 156.8 |
| PAT margin | 8.3% | 18.5% | 15.5% |
| EPS, ₹ (adjusted for split and bonus) | 2.63 | 6.59 | 9.51 |
Three things stand out.
The margin doubled in FY25 and the DRHP is candid about why. Two reasons: Chinese module oversupply crushed input prices, and FY25's first wind projects were carried as inventory at year-end so their costs landed in FY26. Neither is a permanent structural gain. The FY26 margin held at 24% on double the revenue, which is the more reassuring data point — but it is one year.
Finance costs went up eight-fold. From ₹4 crore to ₹34 crore, because the company issued ₹160 crore of non-convertible debentures at 12.75% between September and October 2025 and drew working-capital lines. The IPO exists in large part to retire those NCDs.
Employee costs went from 2.1% to 5.2% of revenue. Headcount is 457 permanent staff plus 683 contract labourers. Some of this is the cost of building a company that can execute 200 MW a year; some is the cost of preparing for a listing. Either way, operating leverage is not what drove the FY26 margin.
09Balance sheet
| FY24 | FY25 | FY26 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Property, plant & equipment | 5.1 | 28.3 | 91.7 |
| Capital work in progress | — | — | 46.7 |
| Goodwill & other non-current | 0.3 | 12.4 | 13.5 |
| Non-current assets | 5.4 | 40.7 | 151.9 |
| Inventories | 1.7 | 26.1 | 211.6 |
| Trade receivables | 59.9 | 103.7 | 345.3 |
| Cash and cash equivalents | 5.0 | 55.7 | 28.0 |
| Other bank balances (mostly BG margin) | 0.0 | 17.5 | 87.7 |
| Other current assets | 62.2 | 149.7 | 171.8 |
| Current assets | 128.7 | 352.7 | 844.4 |
| Total assets | 134.1 | 393.4 | 996.3 |
| Equity share capital | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Other equity | 48.5 | 252.5 | 466.2 |
| Total equity | 48.6 | 252.6 | 466.3 |
| Non-current borrowings | 4.8 | 9.8 | 223.9 |
| Current borrowings | 3.6 | 22.6 | 72.3 |
| Trade payables | 50.0 | 68.4 | 176.9 |
| Other liabilities & provisions | 27.1 | 40.1 | 56.9 |
| Total liabilities | 85.5 | 140.9 | 530.0 |
Share capital shows ₹0.12 crore because the 1,400-for-1 bonus issue happened on April 28, 2026, after the balance-sheet date. Post-bonus paid-up capital is ₹169.5 crore on 16.95 crore shares.
The balance sheet grew seven-fold in two years, and almost all of the growth is working capital. Receivables tripled in FY26 alone. Inventory went up eight-fold. The company funded this with ₹166 crore of new equity from pre-IPO investors across FY25–26, ₹296 crore of borrowings, and ₹109 crore of stretched payables.
Two further items. Bank guarantees outstanding went from nil to ₹85 crore in two years; these are largely load-flow-study security to TNGECL, and the ₹88 crore of "other bank balances" is mostly margin money against them — not free cash. And the auditors' CARO report for FY26 notes that quarterly stock and receivable statements submitted to lenders differed materially from the books in all four quarters. The company calls it timing. Lenders may or may not.
10Where the cash went
| FY24 | FY25 | FY26 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operating profit before working capital | 56.2 | 132.3 | 252.0 |
| Increase in receivables | (47.1) | (43.9) | (236.3) |
| Increase in inventories | 0.2 | (24.4) | (183.0) |
| Increase in other current assets | (34.7) | (94.6) | (11.2) |
| Increase in payables & other liabilities | 52.2 | 31.1 | 114.7 |
| Other working capital | (7.6) | 7.0 | (2.1) |
| Taxes paid | (12.9) | (31.8) | (53.1) |
| Operating cash flow | 6.2 | (24.3) | (119.0) |
| Capex, net | (3.9) | (25.2) | (120.0) |
| Fixed deposits and security deposits | 3.1 | (29.2) | (63.7) |
| Investing cash flow | (0.8) | (54.4) | (183.7) |
| Equity raised | — | 109.5 | 57.0 |
| Borrowings, net | 3.3 | 23.9 | 251.7 |
| Interest paid | (5.0) | (4.1) | (34.0) |
| Financing cash flow | (1.7) | 129.4 | 274.7 |
| Net change in cash | 3.7 | 50.7 | (28.0) |
Read the FY26 column top to bottom. The business generated ₹252 crore of cash profit. It then put ₹236 crore into receivables and ₹183 crore into inventory, clawed back ₹115 crore from suppliers, paid ₹53 crore of tax, and ended ₹119 crore in the hole. It then spent ₹120 crore on cranes, land, an MMS plant and a subsidiary. The ₹300 crore gap was filled by debt and pre-IPO equity.
Is this a problem or a phase? The bull case: a company that develops sites before it has customers and carries turbine inventory until commissioning will always have working capital that runs ahead of revenue during a growth spurt. FY26's 37 ongoing projects all complete by December 2026; as they bill out, receivables should convert. The bear case: receivable days went from 49 to 124 in two years, the company doesn't disclose customer concentration or ageing in its summary, and it needed 12.75% money with a promoter share pledge to get through the year. The IPO's ₹175 crore working-capital object and ₹160 crore NCD redemption are, put plainly, the company asking public investors to refinance FY26.
Part four · The people
11The two brothers
Muthuraj Periyasamy, 42, is chairman and managing director and owns 81.8% of the company. His brother Jayendran, 38, is executive director and owns 0.1%. Both are mechanical engineering diploma holders from Tirunelveli district with 17 years in renewables; Muthuraj also holds a B.Tech from Calorx Teachers' University, Ahmedabad. Before Renfra, Muthuraj ran a sole proprietorship called Speed Team Wind Turbine Engineers, later renamed Renfra Spares and Services, where Jayendran was a manager and where Malarmathi — now a non-executive director — ran supply chain.
Muthuraj was not an original promoter. The company was incorporated in 2017 by Palanisamy, S.I. Balaji and M.V. Naseema; Muthuraj came in through a January 2021 rights issue and a series of transfers at ₹100 per share, and became the controlling shareholder. His total cash outlay for 9,900 old shares was under ₹10 lakh. After the 10:1 split and 1,400:1 bonus, that is 13.87 crore shares at a cost of roughly ₹0.007 each. At ₹122 the stake is worth ₹1,692 crore.
The three independent directors — two retired public-sector bankers and an advocate — all joined in 2026. The DRHP itself lists as a risk that most directors have no experience on a listed board. The CFO and company secretary are not promoters; the DRHP discloses no promoter remuneration issues and related-party transactions were 4.7% of FY26 revenue (9.0% in FY25), chiefly land aggregation through Speed Boomi Promoters LLP and material supply from Wandse Solutions.
Two things an investor should hold in mind. First, Muthuraj has personally guaranteed the ₹160 crore of NCDs and pledged shares against them; a promoter pledge in an unlisted company is a real constraint on his flexibility until the IPO clears it. Second, execution knowledge — the substation map, the land relationships — sits with him. Key-person risk here is not a boilerplate line.
12Who else owns it
The remaining 18% was sold in eight private placements between December 2024 and December 2025, all at ₹10 lakh per share of ₹100 face value. That sounds enormous until you follow the corporate actions: each ₹100 share became 10 shares of ₹10 in March 2026, and each of those became 1,401 shares in the April 2026 bonus. The DRHP does the maths for you.
Roughly 2,600 shares were sold this way to over a hundred names: two Mauritius funds (Dovetail Global and Nova Global Opportunities, 2.1 crore post-bonus shares each), Bloomfield Pre-IPO Opportunities Fund, Mangal Keshav Capital, and a long tail of HNIs, HUFs and small AIFs from Gujarat and Mumbai. Twenty-seven of them are selling 47.9 lakh shares in the offer for sale — about 1.5% of the pre-offer capital, or 16% of the non-promoter float. They are taking money off the table at the IPO price after a year's hold.
There have been no secondary trades in the 18 months before the DRHP, so ₹122 is a grey-market quote, not a print. It is the price at which someone will sell you a pre-IPO share today; whether anyone is buying at that level in size is a different question.
Part five · The price
13What ₹122 buys
At ₹122 on 16.95 crore pre-offer shares, the company is valued at ₹2,068 crore. Here is what that means against FY26 numbers.
| Measure | Value | Multiple |
|---|---|---|
| Market capitalisation | ₹2,068 cr | |
| Price to FY26 earnings (PAT ₹156.8 cr) | 13.2× | |
| Price to FY26 reported EPS (₹9.51) | 12.8× | |
| Price to book (equity ₹466 cr, ₹27.5/share) | 4.4× | |
| Net debt, March 2026 (borrowings ₹296 cr less cash and bank ₹116 cr) | ₹180 cr | |
| Enterprise value | ₹2,249 cr | |
| EV to FY26 EBITDA (₹245.9 cr) | 9.1× | |
| EV to FY26 revenue | 2.2× | |
| Market cap to remaining order book (₹517 cr) | 4.0× |
If you treat the ₹88 crore of bank-guarantee margin as restricted — which it is — net debt is ₹268 crore and EV/EBITDA is 9.5×. Using May 15 borrowings of ₹405 crore instead of March, EV/EBITDA is about 9.9×.
Thirteen times trailing earnings for a company that grew profit 66% last year, with a 44% return on equity, looks reasonable at a glance. Three adjustments temper it. The earnings are not cash earnings — see 10. The share count will rise at the IPO. And the FY25 margin step-up came partly from a module-price windfall that has already happened.
14Against the peers
The DRHP quoted its four listed peers at 12.3× to 20.0× FY26 earnings on June 25, 2026. Prices have come down since. As of September 7, 2026, KPI Green trades at 13×, Zodiac Energy at 14×, Solarworld at 11× and K.P. Energy at 9× — a range of 9–14× and an average of 11.75×. Applied to Renfra's ₹9.51 EPS:
So ₹122 sits inside the peer range, about 9% above the peer average and a whisker above KPI Green — the closest thing Renfra has to a benchmark by size and margin profile. The unlisted price has held at ₹122 while the listed peers de-rated over the summer; what was a 21% discount in June is now a small premium.
Is a premium justified? Renfra has the highest ROE in the set (44%, tied with K.P. Energy), the second-highest PAT margin, and 54% three-year revenue growth. Against that, every peer owns generating assets that earn annuity income and Renfra does not; Renfra is a single-state business; and its receivable days are longer than all but one peer. The fair multiple for a high-ROE, high-growth pure contractor with concentrated geography is probably in line with the better peers — 12–14× — which puts fair value at ₹114–133 on FY26 earnings. ₹122 is in the middle of that.
The comparison a pre-IPO investor should actually make is with KPI Green at 13×: a 26-year-old listed company with 670 MW commissioned in one year, a Gujarat hybrid portfolio and audited quarterly disclosure, priced the same as an unlisted company with one year of a 24% margin, a promoter pledge, and an auditor's CARO remark. You are paying a listed multiple for an unlisted share; what you get in return is the IPO event and the lock-in.
Part six · The verdict
15What could go wrong
The DRHP lists fifty risk factors. These are the seven that matter.
The cash conversion doesn't happen
Receivables at 124 days and inventory at 76 days of revenue. If customers pay slowly, or a few large projects stall, the company burns cash again in FY27 and the IPO proceeds are consumed by working capital instead of growth. Three years of negative operating cash flow against positive profit is the single biggest red flag in the accounts.
Tamil Nadu changes the rules
100% of projects are in Tamil Nadu and Puducherry and 100% are connected to the state utility. Open-access charges, banking rules, and load-flow policy are all set by the state. TNGECL already changed its security mechanism mid-year in FY25. A less favourable regime for captive solar would hit demand directly, and Renfra has no second market.
FY25–26 margins were a module-price gift
The DRHP says so. Gross margin went from 17% to 35% in one year mostly because Chinese modules got cheap. ALMM domestic-content rules are pushing costs the other way. Peers with the same business model run 14–31% gross margins. A reversion to 25–28% would take a third off EBITDA at constant revenue.
The lender statements and the pledge
Auditors flagged that FY26 quarterly statements to lenders differed materially from the books in every quarter. There are disputed GST demands of ₹1.8 crore. The promoter has pledged shares against ₹160 crore of NCDs. None is fatal; together they describe a company whose finance function is younger than its order book.
Revenue visibility is short
₹517 crore of unbilled work, all contracted to finish by December 2026, against ₹1,014 crore of FY26 revenue. Beyond that the pipeline is grid connectivity, not contracts. A soft H2 FY27 order intake would show up quickly.
Manufacturing is a different business
The MMS factory, the crane fleet, and the wind segment are all under three years old. The DRHP itself calls the MMS plant a "significant departure from our current asset-light model" requiring "operational expertise that we or our subsidiary does not currently possess." Capex went from ₹4 crore to ₹120 crore in two years.
One man knows the substation map
Muthuraj Periyasamy owns 82%, chairs the board, runs execution, procurement and strategy, and personally guarantees the debt. The independent directors joined this year. Succession, delegation and board oversight are all untested.
16What could go right
- The order book converts and the receivables collect. All 37 ongoing projects complete by December 2026. If FY27 H1 shows receivable days falling toward 80 and operating cash flow turning positive, the biggest question in this note answers itself and the discount to peers should close.
- 465.5 MW of secured connectivity turns into contracts. That is 3.3× the current order book. If even half is signed in FY27 at FY26 pricing (~₹6 crore/MW blended), it is ₹1,400 crore of new orders — more than a year's revenue.
- The NCD redemption adds ~10% to earnings on its own. ₹160 crore at 12.75% is ₹20 crore of pre-tax interest, ₹15 crore post-tax, before any operating growth.
- Wind keeps scaling. From 0 to 35% of revenue in two years, with bigger tickets and the Derrick Lifters crane fleet lowering erection cost. The company is targeting 149.5 MW of wind orders in two years against 49.5 MW ever commissioned.
- The MMS plant lands on time. Module mounting structures were ₹25 crore of FY26 purchases. Captive supply at 2,000 tonnes a month from December 2026 would add a point or two of gross margin and, more importantly, remove a lead-time dependency.
- A listing re-rates a pure-play C&I contractor. There is no listed Tamil Nadu C&I renewable EPC pure play. A clean post-IPO balance sheet, 40%+ ROE and mid-teens P/E is a combination small-cap investors have historically paid up for — until the first bad quarter.
17Bottom line
Renfra is a real business with a real edge — grid connectivity and land in a state where both are scarce — and the best return on equity in its peer group. Revenue doubled in FY26, profit grew 66%, and 465 MW of secured connectivity gives it a pipeline more than three times its current order book. The profit is genuine; the cash conversion is the thing to watch, and the IPO is built to fix it.
At ₹122 the share trades at 12.8× FY26 earnings, inside the listed-peer range of 9–14× and at roughly the same multiple as KPI Green. Peer-implied fair value on trailing earnings is ₹114–133; ₹122 is in the middle. On FY27 earnings — if the ₹517 crore order book bills out, the 465 MW pipeline converts, and the NCD redemption adds ~₹15 crore to PAT — the same 12–14× range implies ₹150–190 twelve months out. That is the case for buying: you are paying a fair price today for growth that is already contracted or connected, plus the IPO event.
The case for caution is equally simple: the pre-IPO investors who bought at ₹71 are selling into the OFS, the unlisted price has not moved while listed peers fell 20–30%, and the returns depend on the IPO band being set at or above ₹122. Watch three numbers when the RHP arrives: the price band, receivable days, and operating cash flow. If the first is above ₹122 and the other two are moving the right way, this is a share to hold through listing. If receivables keep climbing, wait for the listed price instead.