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Unlisted Zone
Business note
October 2026

Himalayan Heli Services Limited (HHSL)

Why FY26 dipped, and what changes from here

An Indian helicopter operator focused on pilgrimage shuttles, charters and aerial work since 1998. Revenue fell 13% in FY26 as security bans and natural disasters shut key pilgrimage routes. This note explains that dip, the shift from leased to owned helicopters, how IPO proceeds can cut interest costs, the planned MRO business that widens the revenue base, and valuation at ₹180 per share.

What this note covers

  1. The business in briefWhat HHSL does, its fleet and key FY25–FY26 numbers
  2. Why FY26 revenue fellAmarnath helicopter ban, Vaishno Devi closure, J&K slowdown
  3. From leased to owned helicoptersWhy owning the fleet lifts profit over time
  4. How IPO money cuts interest costDebt at 31 March 2026, loan-wise calculation, savings
  5. MRO: a new revenue lineYear-round income beyond the pilgrimage season
  6. Valuation at ₹180 per shareMarket cap, EV/EBITDA, P/E and price/book
  7. Points to keep in mindGST matter, Amarnath 2026, concentration, IPO details

Where FY26 profit went

Profit before tax and exceptional items, ₹ crore
FY25 profit before tax
13.1
Lower operating profitroute closures in FY26
–2.5
Higher depreciationnewly owned helicopters
–5.1
Higher interestloans for the fleet
–1.9
FY26 profit before tax
3.7

About three-quarters of the profit decline came from depreciation and interest on helicopters the company now owns, not from weaker operations. Operating margin held at 15.6%.

1. The business in brief

HHSL has operated helicopters in India's high-altitude regions since 1998. Its core business is pilgrimage shuttles, carrying devotees to shrines such as Vaishno Devi, Amarnath and the Char Dham circuit. It also runs helicopter tourism, private charters, aerial work (geophysical and LiDAR surveys, external load), defence support, aviation consultancy, and in-house helicopter maintenance. The fleet is built around Airbus H125 (AS350 B3) single-engine helicopters, suited to high-altitude flying.

In FY26, 96% of revenue came from charter and pilgrimage services, with the rest from ground handling and landing income, royalty income and other operations.

Key numbers (audited, ₹ crore)

MetricFY25FY26What it shows
Revenue from operations132.2115.2Route closures (next section)
Operating profit (EBITDA)20.518.0Held up despite lower revenue
EBITDA margin15.5%15.6%Unchanged
Helicopter hire (lease) charges26.615.4Less leasing
Depreciation5.110.2More owned helicopters
Finance cost2.64.4Loans for the fleet
Profit after tax3.72.5
Helicopters & parts (gross block)77.7121.6Plus ₹30.3 cr more under acquisition
Net worth39.049.8Equity raised in FY26
Total borrowings32.764.8Fleet purchases, working capital

2. Why FY26 revenue fell

The 13% revenue decline came almost entirely from charter and pilgrimage services (₹126.5 cr to ₹111.1 cr). Three events outside the company's control hit its most important routes in the same year:

  • Amarnath Yatra ran without helicopters. After the April 2025 Pahalgam attack, the J&K government declared all Amarnath routes a no-flying zone for the 2025 yatra, so no helicopter shuttle operated at all. HHSL had reportedly secured the Amarnath shuttle contract for 2025–2027.
  • Vaishno Devi was shut for 22 days. A landslide on the route on 26 August 2025 led the Shrine Board to suspend the yatra, cancel all helicopter bookings and refund passengers until it reopened in mid-September.
  • J&K tourism slowed after Pahalgam, weighing on charter and tourism demand in the region.
What this means: the revenue fall reflects lost flying days, not lost customers or contracts. The company kept its operating margin steady, which shows its cost base adjusted with the lower activity.

3. From leased to owned helicopters

Historically, HHSL leased part of its fleet, paying a hire charge for every helicopter it did not own. Over FY25–FY26 it moved to owning: helicopter assets rose from ₹48.4 cr to ₹81.6 cr (gross), with a further ₹30.3 cr of aircraft under acquisition. Hire charges fell from ₹26.6 cr to ₹15.4 cr.

Why owning is better over time

  • Lease rent never ends; a loan does. A lease is paid for as long as the helicopter is used. A purchase loan is repaid in 5–7 years, after which the helicopter keeps earning with no rent or EMI attached.
  • The helicopter keeps its value. The company depreciates helicopters over 20 years, and well-maintained aircraft retain resale value. A leased helicopter builds no asset for shareholders.
  • Depreciation is front-loaded. HHSL uses the written-down value method, which charges the highest depreciation in the first years. FY26 profit therefore carries the heaviest charge; it falls each year after.
  • Control over deployment and maintenance. Owned aircraft can be moved between pilgrimage, charter and aerial-work contracts as demand shifts, and maintained in-house to the company's own schedule.
The FY26 effect: owning replaced part of the lease bill with depreciation (non-cash) and interest. That is why reported profit fell more than operating profit. As loans are repaid and depreciation declines, the same fleet produces higher profit.

4. How IPO money cuts interest cost

To fund the fleet and working capital, borrowings doubled to ₹64.8 cr in FY26. Much of this was taken late in the year, so FY26's ₹4.4 cr interest cost understates the full-year burden. Based on the rates disclosed for each loan in the audited accounts:

Debt at 31 March 2026Amount (₹ cr)Avg. rateAnnual interest (₹ cr)
Secured loans (banks, NBFCs, overdraft)42.3~11%~4.7
Unsecured working-capital loans22.2~18%~4.0
Total64.4~13.5%~8.7
Of which, loans at 14% or more37.3~16.7%~6.3

How we calculated this

For every loan in the borrowing schedule (Note 5 of the audited accounts), annual interest = amount outstanding × interest rate. Adding these up gives each bucket's interest, and dividing by the bucket's total outstanding gives its weighted average rate, so larger loans count more.

Lender (₹ lakh)OutstandingRateAnnual interest
Secured loans
Yes Bank – fixed asset loans (4)2,049.578.25–9.25%183.23
Yes Bank – WCTL67.719.25%6.26
InCred Finance1,382.6314.50%200.48
Trustedge Capital200.0016.25%32.50
Yes Bank – overdraft against FD455.008.75%39.81
Vehicle loans (7)73.498.55–10%6.77
Secured total4,228.4011.1%469.05
Unsecured loans
Indresh Financial Services400.0030.00%120.00
ICICI151.1114.50%21.91
Oxyzo127.9014.50%18.55
Kotak119.5214.50%17.33
Tata Capital77.8015.61%12.14
Neo Growth75.0017.50%13.12
34 other NBFC and bank loans1,263.8713.75–18.25%198.24
Unsecured total2,215.2018.1%401.29
All loans6,443.6013.5%870.34

Example: Secured average = 469.05 ÷ 4,228.40 = 11.1%. Loans at 14% or more (InCred, Trustedge, Indresh and most unsecured loans) total ₹3,733.9 lakh with ₹625.4 lakh interest, an average of 16.7%. Figures use balances at 31 March 2026; as EMIs reduce principal, actual interest over the next year will be somewhat lower unless new loans are added. Loan-wise total is ₹64.4 cr against ₹64.8 cr in the balance sheet, as a few scanned rows were not legible.

Using IPO proceeds to repay the costliest loans first saves interest directly:

High-cost debt repaid from IPOInterest saved per year (pre-tax)Compared with FY26 profit before tax (₹3.7 cr)
₹20 cr~₹3.3 crNearly doubles it
₹30 cr~₹5.0 crMore than doubles it
₹37 cr (all 14%+ debt)~₹6.3 crRoughly 2.7×
Beyond the interest saving, repayment would strengthen the balance sheet. Debt-to-equity was 1.30 and debt service coverage 1.0× in FY26; lower debt frees cash flow for fleet growth. Figures are illustrative at the average rate of the high-cost bucket; actual savings depend on the IPO size and how proceeds are allocated.

5. MRO: a new revenue line beyond pilgrimage

The company is working to set up an MRO (maintenance, repair and overhaul) business with Airbus Helicopters. An MRO keeps helicopters airworthy through scheduled inspections, component overhauls, repairs and spare parts, and it can serve other operators' aircraft as well as HHSL's own.

Why it reduces dependence on yatra seasons

  • A different customer base. Today HHSL earns only when its own helicopters fly. An MRO earns from other operators' helicopters too, including those flying for state governments, corporates and other charter companies.
  • Year-round, not seasonal. Helicopters need inspections and overhauls whether or not a yatra is open. FY26 showed how a security ban or landslide can stop flying revenue; maintenance demand continues.
  • Already an MRO for its own fleet. HHSL already carries out maintenance, repair and overhaul on its own helicopters in-house, with its pilots and engineers on the payroll since April 2025. The capability, team and tooling exist today; the new business opens them to other operators.
  • A large addressable fleet. The H125/AS350 family is among the most widely flown civil helicopters in India, giving an Airbus-aligned MRO a ready pool of customers.
  • Better use of existing capacity. Serving outside helicopters keeps engineers and hangar capacity busy in the off-season, when its own fleet flies less, turning a fixed cost into a revenue earner.

6. Valuation at ₹180 per share

The company has 1,11,04,900 equity shares, plus 69 compulsorily convertible preference shares that convert into 5,27,436 equity shares. On a fully diluted basis that is about 1.16 crore shares.

MetricValueHow it is calculated
Market capitalisation₹209.4 cr1,16,32,336 shares × ₹180
Enterprise value₹264.4 crMarket cap + debt ₹64.8 cr − cash & deposits ₹9.8 cr
EV / EBITDA (FY26)14.7×₹264.4 cr ÷ ₹18.0 cr
EV / EBITDA (FY25)12.9×₹264.4 cr ÷ ₹20.5 cr
EV / Revenue (FY26)2.3×₹264.4 cr ÷ ₹115.2 cr
Price / Book4.2×₹209.4 cr ÷ net worth ₹49.8 cr
P/E (FY26 reported)85×₹209.4 cr ÷ PAT ₹2.5 cr

The FY26 P/E looks high because profit was weighed down by route closures and by depreciation and interest on the newly owned fleet. EV/EBITDA, which looks through financing and depreciation, is a fairer measure for an asset-heavy aviation business. As IPO proceeds reduce high-cost debt (see section 4), the interest saving flows directly into profit, lowering the effective P/E.

IPO timing: the company is expected to file its draft offer document in the next few months.

7. Points to keep in mind

  • GST dispute. The audited accounts disclose a ₹65.3 cr GST demand (18% vs the 5% applied on services to the Vaishno Devi Shrine Board) and a ₹6.5 cr service tax matter. The company considers its position tenable on legal advice, and management indicates the GST matter is close to settlement. The final outcome should be confirmed.
  • Amarnath 2026. Helicopter services were again suspended for the 2026 Amarnath Yatra on security grounds, so recovery in FY27 relies on Vaishno Devi, Char Dham and other routes, with Amarnath's return as upside.
  • Route concentration. Revenue remains concentrated in a few pilgrimage routes exposed to weather and security decisions, which the MRO business is designed to offset.
  • IPO and MRO details. The IPO filing is expected in the next few months; its size, price and use of proceeds, and the MRO's investment, approvals and timeline, should be confirmed with management.