FY26 lost ~1,400 hours to floods, cancellations and security events — a recurring, uncontrollable hit to a seasonal model.
A two-decade Himalayan operator turning a seasonal, leased pilgrimage business into a year-round, owned-fleet one — just as a long-running tax overhang lifts.
Himalayan Heli Services (HHSL) flies pilgrims, soldiers and surveyors into some of the most demanding airspace on earth. For most of its twenty-plus years it has been a leased-fleet, summer-led pilgrimage operator — Vaishno Devi, Kedarnath, the Char Dham circuit, Amarnath — with 70,000+ flight hours and 30 lakh+ passengers behind it.
FY26 was the hardest year in two decades. A cancelled Amarnath Yatra, floods across the pilgrimage belt and security suspensions cost it roughly 1,400 flying hours and ~₹30 Cr of business. Yet revenue still held near ₹115 Cr and EBITDA margins barely moved — the first proof that the second engine is working.
That second engine is a deliberate rewiring of the business: from leased to owned aircraft, and from a single summer season to a year-round profile built on winter defence and survey flying. This note walks through how it makes money, how it buys its helicopters, where growth comes from, the just-resolved GST case, and what investors are actually paying ahead of a planned listing.
HHSL sits in the non-scheduled helicopter operator (NSOP) segment of Indian civil aviation — charter and seat-share rotary-wing flying, not fixed-route airline service. Incorporated in 1998 and now a public (still unlisted) company, the core model is simple: it sells flying hours. What changes is the wrapper around those hours, across four segments:
A defining edge: HHSL is a CAR-145 certified maintenance organisation, servicing its own fleet in-house. That is unusual at this scale and is the source of a claimed 10–15% cost advantage over peers who outsource maintenance — it also protects aircraft availability during the short, weather-bound windows that define the business.
The same difficulty that makes the business brutal — terrain, certification, safety record, multi-year relationships — is exactly what keeps the competitive set small.
The fleet is built almost entirely on the Airbus AS350 B3 / H125 — a single-engine workhorse prized for hot-and-high performance, exactly what Himalayan routes demand. Historically HHSL leased most aircraft (including from a Norwegian lessor); today it is pivoting hard to ownership.
In FY26 the company acquired two new helicopters (debt-funded), inducted VT-HHC (its workhorse), took delivery of its 5th owned machine VT-HHD, and returned a leased aircraft (VT-HHA). That leaves 6 aircraft — 5 owned, 1 leased (VT-HHB), i.e. ~83% owned.
931 hours flown in FY26 — the single largest contributor and the year's workhorse.
Delivered 24 Mar 2026, flying from 18 Apr, 50 hours on Chardham by month-end.
Lease costs fall ₹26.6 Cr → ₹15.4 Cr → ~₹6 Cr (FY25→26→27E). Buying out VT-HHB takes HHSL to a 100%-owned fleet.
Underneath it all sits a medium-term tailwind: Airbus and Tata Advanced Systems have opened India's first private H125 assembly line in Karnataka (deliveries from early 2027), with Airbus–SIDBI financing for smaller operators — pointing to lower future acquisition costs for a company standardised on exactly this aircraft.
Growth here is not just "fly more pilgrims." HHSL's path to a bigger, better business runs along five lines:
Summer deployment is secured across all four marquee pilgrimage sectors for roughly three years, with defence anchoring the winters:
FY27: 3 aircraft planned for Amarnath (Jul–Aug 2026) targeting 700–800 hours, with pent-up demand after 2025's cancellation. Chardham May 2026 seats already sold out.
The Char Dham Yatra drew a record 47+ lakh pilgrims in 2025 despite floods, with Kedarnath alone near 16.5 lakh. Better roads, disaster response and digital booking keep widening the funnel, while an ageing, increasingly affluent pilgrim base prizes the time-saving access only helicopters give. 2025's cancellations have created visible pent-up demand for FY27.
India remains badly under-served for civil helicopters relative to its terrain and population. Industry estimates put the helicopter-leasing market on a path from ~US$163 mn (2024) to ~US$352 mn by 2033 (~9% CAGR), with the heliport market nearing US$4.75 bn by 2030 — a long runway for safety-certified incumbents. Defence, EMS and disaster flying add counter-cyclical, year-round demand.
Revenue compounded from ₹98.9 Cr (FY23) to a peak ₹132.4 Cr (FY25) before FY26's force-majeure dip to ₹115.5 Cr. The more telling line is the flight path of margins: EBITDA margin kept rising — 11.2% → 14.1% → 15.7% → 15.3% — even as FY26 revenue descended. The owned-fleet shift is doing real work on the cost base.
| Particulars | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 (U) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Air hours | 5,537 | 5,792 | 6,107 | 5,124 |
| Total revenue | 98.89 | 115.06 | 132.42 | 115.46 |
| EBITDA | 11.05 | 16.25 | 21.00 | 17.70 |
| EBITDA margin | 11.2% | 14.1% | 15.7% | 15.3% |
FY26 revenue fell ~13% on lost flying, but the cost mix shifted with the fleet transition: helicopter O&M dropped sharply as leased-aircraft costs fell away, while staff costs rose as crew and engineers came in-house. Depreciation and finance costs both climbed on debt-funded purchases — together explaining most of the profit fall, even as EBITDA held.
| Particulars | FY25 | FY26 (U) |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue from operations | 132.16 | 115.18 |
| Other income | 0.27 | 0.29 |
| Total income | 132.42 | 115.47 |
| Helicopter O&M expenses | 84.56 | 52.35 |
| Employee benefits | 14.15 | 32.85 |
| Other expenses | 12.91 | 12.49 |
| EBITDA | ~21.0 | ~17.7 |
| Finance cost | 2.58 | 4.31 |
| Depreciation & amortisation | 5.11 | 9.43 |
| Exceptional items | 1.90 | — |
| Profit before tax | 11.21 | 4.04 |
| Tax | 7.46 | 1.16 |
| Profit after tax | 3.74 | 2.88 |
The balance sheet tells the ownership story plainly. Net property, plant & equipment nearly tripled to ₹99.3 Cr as helicopters moved onto the books, funded by total borrowings rising to ₹64.8 Cr. Net worth grew to ₹51.3 Cr on retained earnings and the equity raise. Gearing has risen — net debt/equity around 1.1x — the expected cost of building an owned fleet.
| Particulars | FY25 | FY26 (U) |
|---|---|---|
| Shareholders' funds | 39.02 | 51.34 |
| of which: reserves & surplus | 27.91 | 40.23 |
| Long-term borrowings | 18.08 | 45.10 |
| Short-term borrowings | 14.58 | 19.70 |
| Total equity & liabilities | 114.29 | 143.49 |
| Net PP&E (incl. CWIP) | 43.99 | 99.30 |
| Trade receivables | 12.70 | 8.63 |
| Cash & bank balances | 8.00 | 9.94 |
| Total assets | 114.29 | 143.49 |
FY26 figures are management-reported and unaudited; certain expense line items are derived from the unaudited statements and may be reclassified on audit. EBITDA is as disclosed by the company.
For years one question hung over the sector: is helicopter passenger transport taxed at 5% or 18%? HHSL charged 5%, treating it as economy-class air transport; authorities argued non-scheduled flying fell in an 18% residuary bucket and raised differential demands of ~13% plus interest and penalty across FY18–FY20, running into several crore over two jurisdictions.
The 54th GST Council settled it: Notification 07/2024 & Circular 234/2024 fixed seat-share helicopter transport at 5%, regularising the past on an "as is where is" basis.
Uttarakhand (State Tax, Dehradun): three appeals across FY18–FY20 — combined demand ~₹7.36 Cr — were fully allowed and quashed by the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) on 20 December 2025, holding 5% correct, dropping all interest and penalty, and recording no suppression or intent to evade.
Jammu & Kashmir: parallel demands hit the Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Board, HHSL and Global Vectra. The Board and Global Vectra already won at the Commissioner (Appeals). HHSL's High Court writ was withdrawn on 20 April 2026 with liberty to pursue the same appellate remedy — resolution anticipated by June 2026.
Net effect for an investor: a multi-crore contingent liability and an interpretational overhang are being removed, with peers' rulings setting precedent. Tax paid at the higher rate is to be recomputed at 5% and, if excess, refunded.
HHSL has funded its fleet transition through debt plus private placements, and is now moving toward a listing.
| Measure | Basis | Approx. |
|---|---|---|
| Pre-money valuation | Dec 2025 placement | ₹174.3 Cr |
| Shares outstanding | ₹10 face value | ~1.11 Cr |
| Secondary market quote | unlisted, May 2026 | ~₹145–160 |
| P/E (FY26 PAT ₹2.88 Cr) | on ~₹175–183 Cr cap | ~61–63x |
| P/E (FY25 PAT ₹3.74 Cr) | on ~₹175–183 Cr cap | ~47–49x |
| EV / EBITDA (FY26) | incl. net debt ~₹55 Cr | ~13x |
| Price / book (FY26) | net worth ₹51.3 Cr | ~3.4x |
Trailing multiples look optically rich — but FY26 earnings were depressed by ~₹30 Cr of lost business. The bull case rests on normalised earnings: full pilgrimage flying restored, lease costs down to ~₹6 Cr, a 100%-owned fleet, GST overhang gone. The bear case is that these multiples leave little room for further weather, safety or tender disappointment — on a balance sheet now carrying materially more debt.
FY26 lost ~1,400 hours to floods, cancellations and security events — a recurring, uncontrollable hit to a seasonal model.
Single-engine high-altitude flying; an accident anywhere on a route can trigger blanket suspensions and DGCA scrutiny.
Marquee pilgrimage contracts are periodically recompeted; losing one removes a revenue pillar.
Debt-funded fleet has pushed gearing past ~1x; finance and depreciation now weigh on reported profit.
~60% of revenue is pilgrimage-linked and geographically clustered, though diversification is underway.
Unlisted shares carry illiquidity and price-discovery risk; the IPO timeline and pricing remain uncertain.